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Comments
THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
PROCEDURE GOVERNING NOTICE OF JUDICIAL SALES OF
REAL PROPERTY AFTER MENNONITE BOARD, FIRST
PENNSYLVANIA BANK, AND IN RE UPSET SALE, TAX CLAIM
BUREAU OF BERKS COUNT)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pennsylvania, a judicial sale of real property extinguishes all in-
terests in the subject property acquired subsequent to the interest of an
executing judgment creditor such as a foreclosing mortgagee.' Despite
the loss of these junior interests, Pennsylvania law does not require the
executing judgment creditor to join the holders of such interests in the
mortgage foreclosure action, 2 nor does it require the creditor to give
them actual notice of the pending sheriffs sale.3 As a result, the sale of
the property may deprive the holders of these secondary interests of the
opportunity to protect their property interests. In three recent cases,
counties were found to have violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment 4 when they foreclosed upon real property to satisfy
tax liens without giving actual notice of the pending property sale to
holders of recorded interests in the property.
In June 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States in Mennonite
Board of iissions v. Adams 5 held that states must provide for personal
service or mailed notice of a pending tax sale of real property to the
holder of a recorded first mortgage in order to meet the requirements of
the due process clause. 6 More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court applied the Mennonite Board holding in a factually similar case, First
Pennsylvania Bank v. Lancaster County Tax Claim Bureau.7 In addition, in In
1. For a discussion of Pennsylvania law in this regard, see infra notes 19-22
and accompanying text.
2. For the Pennsylvania law in this regard, see infra note 16 and accompany-
ing text.
3. For the text of the relevant Pennsylvania notice statute, see in ra note 14.
For a discussion of this notice statute, see infra notes 14-18 and accompanying
text.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment
provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . Id.
5. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
6. Id. at 798-800. For a discussion of AMennonite Board, see infra notes 42-70
and accompanying text.
7. 504 Pa. 179, 185-87, 470 A.2d 938, 941-42 (1983). For a discussion of
First Pennsylvania Bank, see infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
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re Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks County,8 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court broadened the protections afforded under Mennonite Board, and
held that the due process clause requires the state to provide holders of
recorded judgment liens with personal service or mailed notice of a
pending tax sale. These cases suggest that the Pennsylvania notice re-
quirements governing judicial sales of property in private mortgage
foreclosure actions may be constitutionally infirm.
This comment will analyze Mennonite Board, First Pennsylvania Bank,
and In re Upset Sale and their impact on the constitutionality of Penn-
sylvania's notice requirements for judicial sales of real property 1 In ad-
dition, this comment will discuss a case that, before it was settled while
pending in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, presented constitutional
challenges to the notice requirements for Pennsylvania judicial sales of
real property.10 Finally, this comment will review a proposed amend-
ment II to the Pennsylvania judicial sale notice statute to determine
whether its enactment would bring Pennsylvania law within the require-
ments of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTUAL NOTICE OF PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL
SALES OF REAL PROPERTY
In Pennsylvania, a mortgagee wishing to foreclose upon real prop-
erty must resort to a judicial foreclosure proceeding. This proceeding is
governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.12 After a fore-
closing mortgagee obtains a judgment from a court against a defaulting
8. 505 Pa. 327, 334-36, 479 A.2d 940,943-44 (1984). For a discussion of In
re Upset Sale, see infra notes 91-119 and accompanying text.
9. This comment addresses the constitutional sufficiency of the notice pro-
visions of rule 3129 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, it
considers the state's obligation to give notice of pending execution sales to per-
sons holding liens or other interests in the subject property. See PA. R. Ci'. P.
3129. A related topic, which is beyond the scope of this comment, is the consti-
tutional adequacy of the notice given judgment debtors of execution sales of real
property under rule 3129. See id. In Scott v. Adal Corp., the court held that
Pennsylvania's sheriffs sale system violates the procedural due process rights of
judgment debtors by failing to inform them of their pre-judgment rights to pre-
vent a sheriffs sale or of any procedures available for setting aside a sale. 11
Phila. Co. Rep. 3, 9-10 (1984). Judge Murray C. Goldman of the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas therefore ordered that all sheriffs sales initiated in Phil-
adelphia County after October 2, 1984, be enjoined unless they complied with
the due process requirements set forth in his opinion. Id. at 10-11.
10. For a discussion of Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, see infra notes
124-52 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of Recommendation No. 68, the proposed amendment
to PA. R. Civ. P. 3129, see infra notes 166-201 and accompanying text.
12. PA. R. Civ. P. 1141-1150, 3180-3183. See Auten, Pennsvhania MVorigage
Foreclosures, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURES, PA. BAR
INST. 1 (1984) (outlining legal steps in Pennsylvania mortgage foreclosure pro-
cedures); Note, Mortgage Foreclosure in Pennsvlvania, 85 DICK. L. REV. 275, (1980-
1981) (discussing Pennsylvania mortgage foreclosure procedures).
1192 [Vol. 30: p. 1191
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mortgagor, 13 the judgment is satisfied out of the proceeds from a judi-
cial sale of the mortgaged property.
Pennsylvania's notice requirements for mortgage foreclosure sales
are contained in rule 3129 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 14 Rule 3129 requires that an executing judgment creditor provide
13. PA. R. Civ. P. 1149. Rule 1149 provides that "[j]udgment in the action
shall be enforced as provided by Rules 3180 to 3183, inclusive." Id. "Action" is
defined by rule 1141(a) as "an action at law to foreclose a mortgage upon any
estate, leasehold or interest in land but shall not include an action to enforce a
personal liability." PA. R. Civ. P. 1141(a).
14. PA. R. Civ. P. 3181(o, 3129. Rule 3181 governs the enforcement of
judgments for money payments. PA. R. Civ. P. 3181. Rule 3181 provides in
pertinent part as follows: "The procedure for the enforcement of a judgment
shall be in accordance with the rules governing the enforcement ofjudgments
for the payment of money with respect to the following: .. . (f) Notice of Sale,
Stay, Continuance:-Rule 3129." PA. R. Civ. P. 3181(o. Rule 3129 provides:
Notice of Sale. Real Property
(a) No writ of execution to sell real property shall issue upon a
judgment until the plaintiff or some person on his behalf has filed of
record with the prothonotary an affidavit setting forth to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief the name and last known address of
the owner or reputed owner and of the defendant in the judgment. A
copy of the affidavit shall be delivered to the sheriff together with the
writ of execution. If after a good faith investigation the name of the
owner or reputed owner or his address or the whereabouts of the de-
fendant in the judgment cannot be ascertained, the affidavit shall so
state.
(b) Notice of the sale of real property shall be given by handbills,
by written notice to the defendant in the judgment and the owner or
reputed owner and by publication, as hereinafter provided. ...
(1) The handbills shall be posted by the sheriff in his office
and upon the property at least twenty (20) days before the sale,
briefly describing the property to bc sold, its location, the improve-
ments if any, the judgment of the court on which the sale is being
held, the name of the owner or reputed owner, and the time and
place of sale. The handbill shall also include the notice of a sched-
ule of distribution required by subdivision (c) of this rule.
(2) The written notice shall be prepared by the plaintiff and
shall contain the same information as the handbills and shall be
served by the sheriff at least twenty (20) days before the sale on the
defendant in the judgment if his whereabouts are known and on
the owner or reputed owner if his name and address are known
and on no other person, either:
(a) in the manner provided for the service of a writ of
summons in a civil action, or
(b) by registered mail, return receipt requested, ad-
dressed to each one at his last known address set forth in the
affidavit
as the plaintiff may direct at the time he delivers the written notice
to the sheriff for service or, if the plaintiff fails to direct, as the
sheriff may elect.
Note: Registered mail includes certified mail. See Definition Rule
76.
(3) If the written notice is served by registered mail, service
is complete when the letter is mailed, and if for any reason the
1985] COMMENT 1193
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actual written notice to the defendant in the judgment and to the owner
of the property. 15 The rule does not require an executing judgment
creditor to join 16 or to give actual notice to any mortgagees, lienholders,
letter is not delivered or claimed or if delivery is refused or if the
return receipt is not executed or if the sheriff fails to receive any
information from the post office respecting the letter before the
date fixed for the sale, the validity of the service shall not be im-
paired and the sale shall proceed at the time fixed in the notice. All
information or material received by the sheriff from the post office
respecting the letter, whether before or after the sale, shall be filed
of record.
(4) Notice containing the information required by subdivi-
sion (b)(l) shall also be given by publication by the sheriff once a
week for three (3) successive weeks in a newspaper of general cir-
culation in the county and in the legal publication, if any, desig-
nated by rule of court for publication of notices, the first
publication to be made not less than twenty-one (21) days before
the date of sale.
Note: See Note to Rule 3128 as to time, terms and conditions of
sale. See also Rule 3131. as to advertisement where a parcel of real
property extends across county lines.
(c) The notice of sale provided in subdivision (b) shall
include a notice directed to all parties in interest and claimants
that a schedule of distribution will be filed by the sheriff on a
date specified by the sheriff not later than thirty (30) days after
sale and that distribution will be made in accordance with the
schedule unless exceptions are filed thereto within ten (10)
days thereafter. No further notice of the filing of the schedule
of distribution need be given.
(d) If the sale is stayed or continued or adjourned gener-
ally, new notice shall be given as provided by subdivisions (b)
and (c). If the sale is continued or adjourned at the direction
of the plaintiff to a date certain within forty-five (45) days, and
public announcement of the adjournment and new date is
made to the bidders assembled at the time and place originally
fixed for the sale, no new notice shall be required, but there
may be only one such continuance or adjournment to a date
certain without new notice.
(e) Rescinded and effective Nov. 6, 1975.
Note: This subdivision is deleted in view of the amend-
ment of subdivisions (a) and (b) which provide for notice to
the defendant and owner.
PA. R. Civ. P. 3129.
15. PA. R. Civ. P. 3129 (b). The "defendant in the judgment" and the
"owner of the property" are usually the same person or persons. There are
situations, however, where the obligor on the defaulted note (the defendant in
the judgment) is not the owner of the property that has been mortgaged to se-
cure the note. A mortgagor/obligor who initially owns the mortgaged property
may subsequently deed the property to a third person who takes the property
subject to the mortgage.
16. U.S. v. Brosnan, 264 F.2d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1959), aft'd, 373 U.S. 237
(1960); United States v. Cless, 254 F.2d 590, 591 (3d Cir. 1958); PA. R. Civ. P.
1144(a). Rule 1144(a) provides that the plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure ac-
tion "shall name as defendants (1) the mortgagor; (2) the personal representa-
tive, heir or devisee of a deceased mortgagor, if known; and (3) the real owner of
the property, or if he is unknown, the grantee in the last recorded deed." Id.
1194
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or claimants with interests in the real property, even if their interests are
recorded.17 Rule 3129 only requires an executing judgment creditor to
give mortgagees, lienholders, and other claimants constructive notice of
a pending sheriffs sale by posting handbills and publishing advertise-
ments in newspapers.18
The legal effect of a mortgage foreclosure sale in Pennsylvania is
"to extinguish the mortgagor's interest in the property and to transfer
the estate to the purchaser as fully as it existed in the mortgagor at the
date of the mortgage."' 9 The sale therefore extinguishes all intervening
estates,2 0 liens, 2' and interests in the property that were acquired subse-
17. PA. R. Civ. P. 3129 explanatory comment (Purdon Supp. 1985). The
explanatory comment to the 1975 amendments to rule 3129 provides:
The notice, of course, is to be served on the defendant only if his
whereabouts are known and on the owner or reputed owner only if his
name and address are known. If these are unknown, service is of
course impossible. The Rule specifically provides that the plaintiff need not
attempt to serve any persons other than the judgment defendant and the owner or
reputed owner.
Id. (emphasis added).
In 1975, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court amended rule 3129 in response
to its decision in Luskey v. Steffron, Inc. Id. See Luskey, 461 Pa. 305, 336 A.2d
298 (1975), aff'd on rehearing, 469 Pa. 377, 366 A.2d 223 (1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 968 (1977). In Luskev, the court decided that the then current rule 3129
violated the due process clause of the United States Constitution because it
failed to provide for actual, personal notice to the owner of the real estate that
was the subject of a sheriffs sale. 461 Pa. at 308-309, 336 A.2d at 299. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court thereafter amended rule 3129(b) to require notice
of a foreclosure sale "by written notice to the defendant in the judgment and the
owner or reputed owner." PA. R. Civ. P. 3129(b). However, rule 3129(b) as it
exists today still "specifically provides that the plaintiff need not attempt to serve
any persons other than the judgment defendant and the owner or reputed
owner [with actual written notice]." PA. R. Civ. P. 3129(b) explanatory com-
ment. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brosnan, 264 F.2d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1959) ("Pennsylvania
law requires no more notice to junior lienors than is afforded by publication
land posting] before subjecting their liens to extinguishment" in mortgage fore-
closure proceeding), afjd, 363 U.S. 127 (1960); Emporium Trust Co. v. Do-
laway, 205 F. Supp. 280, 282 (M.D. Pa. 1961) ("Under Pennsylvania law notice
of a sheriffs sale is not given to lienholders except by newspaper publication
and the posting of handbills." (citing PA. R. Civ. P. 3128, 3129)); Milstein v. S &
K Co., 20 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 521, 525-26, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 339, 344-45 (1970)
(no burden imposed under rule 3129 on execution creditor to give actual notice
of sheriffs sale to holder of valid lien or claim on realty).
18. PA. R. Civ. P. 3129(b)(1), (4). For the provisions of rule 3129(b), see
supra note 14. For a review of cases interpreting and applying rule 3129 to
lienholders, see supra note 17.
19. Florida First Bon Capital Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 40 Pa. Commw.
448, 451, 397 A.2d 838, 841 (1979) (citing Hartman v. Ogborn, 54 Pa. 120
(1867); Metropolitan Bond Co. v. Atlas Paste Co., 111 Pittsburgh L.J. 421, 31
Pa. D. & C.2d 656 (1963)). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8152(c) (Purdon 1982)
("A judicial or other sale of real estate in proceedings under a priorjudgment or
prior ground rent, or in foreclosure of a prior mortgage, shall discharge a mort-
gage later in lien.").
20. An example of an intervening estate that is defeated by a mortgage
foreclosure is found in Frank v. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 216 Pa. 40,
19851 COMMENT 1195
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quent to the mortgage.2 2 For example, a judicial sale to satisfy a de-
faulted first mortgage discharges the liens of all junior lienholders,
including those of second mortgagees. 23 The junior lienholders are rel-
egated to their priority share of the proceeds from the sale.2 ' If the
amount realized at the sheriffs sale is insufficient to satisfy all prior ex-
penses of conducting the sale, the foreclosing mortgagee's judgment,
and the interests of any other, more senior intervening mortgagees,
lienholders, or claimants, then the junior lienholders will be completely
divested of their interests in the real estate without any monetary
recovery. 25
64 A. 894 (1906). In Frank, the owner of a ground rent purchased the land itself
and failed to indicate in a later mortgage of the land an intention to prevent a
merger of the rent and the fee. Id. at 43, 64 A. at 895. Thereafter the owner
assigned the ground rent to another. Id. The purchaser of the property at the
sheriff's sale brought an equitable action to declare the ground rent extin-
guished. Id. at 41, 64 A. at 894. The court held that as against the purchaser of
the land under foreclosure of the mortgage, the assignee took nothing. Id. at 50,
64 A. at 898.
21. Liss v. Medary Homes, Inc., 388 Pa. 139, 143, 130 A.2d 137, 139 (1957)
("As a general rule a sheriffs sale of real estate discharges all liens ... on the
property sold unless the sale is made expressly subject to a prior lien . . .or
unless it is otherwise provided by statute .... (citations and emphasis omitted)
(quoting Silverman v. Keal, 135 Pa. Super. 568, 57Q. 7 A.2d 57, 58 (1939)));
Public Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Neumann, 334 Pa. Super. 389, 392, 483 A.2d
505, 507 (1984) ("It is well established in Pennsylvania that a sheriffs sale of
real property discharges all liens which are not satisfied of record at the time of
sale." (emphasis in original)); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8152(c) (Purdon 1982).
For the provisions of § 8152, see supra note 19.
22. Florida First Bon Capital Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Board, 40 Pa.
Commw. 448, 451-52, 397 A.2d 838, 841 (1979). See also United States v. Cless,
254 F.2d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 1958) (subordinate mortgage lien of United States
divested by foreclosure of prior mortgage in accordance with Pennsylvania law);
Richmond v. Bennett, 205 Pa. 470, 473, 55 A. 17, 18 (1903) (sheriff's deed ef-
fected transfer of easement created subsequent to mortgage); Woods v. White,
97 Pa. 222, 226-27 (1881) (sheriffs sale of land discharged lien of legacy from
land and attached lien to money arising from sale); Vanderwerff v. Consumers
Gas Co., 166 Pa. Super. 358, 363-64, 71 A.2d 809, 811-12 (1950) (foreclosure
defeated easements acquired or created subsequent to mortgage); Metropolitan
Bond Co. v. Atlas Paste Co., 111 Pittsburgh L.J. 421, 424, 31 D. & C.2d 656, 663
(1963) (foreclosure extinguished assignment made following mortgage).
23. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8152(c) (Purdon 1982). For the text of
§ 8152(c), see supra note 19.
24. Trustees of Roman Catholic High School v. McCann, 246 Pa. 28, 30, 91
A. 1051, 1052 (1914) (mortgage foreclosure sale divested right of mechanics
lienholder to pursue premises in satisfaction of claim leaving lienholder to pur-
sue fund produced by sale for satisfaction) (citing Rosenberg v. Cupersmith, 240
Pa. 162, 165, 87 A. 570, 570 (1913)).
25. Although a thorough discussion of Pennsylvania substantive law con-
cerning priority of liens in the distribution of proceeds from the sheriffs sale of
real property is beyond the scope of this comment, the normal order of distribu-
tion is as follows: costs of the writ and sale itself, local real estate taxes, lien of
the foreclosed mortgage, attorney's fees and costs, and subsequent liens, includ-
ing federal tax liens, in the order of their priority. See, e.g., Union Bank & Trust
Co. v. Whitaker, 62 Schuylkill Legal Rec. 16, 16-18 (1961).
1196 [Vol. 30: p. 1191
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Actual notice of foreclosure sales is therefore essential to enable
junior mortgagees, 26 lienholders, and claimants to protect their inter-
ests. If they receive actual notice, they may attend the sale and bid for
the property or they may, at least, encourage others to bid 2 7 so as to
maximize the price paid for the property and their share of the pro-
ceeds. 28 The existing requirement that these parties be afforded con-
structive notice does not adequately protect their interests. Claimants
failing to see the posted or published notice of a sale are precluded from
protecting their liens or other property interests in the real property. 2 9
26. See Liss v. Medary Homes, 388 Pa. 139, 143, 130 A.2d 137, 139 (1957).
The Liss court stated that "[a]s a general rule a sheriffs sale of real estate dis-
charges all liens [prior as well as subsequent liens] on the property sold unless
the sale is expressly made subject to a prior lien or liens ... or unless it is otherwise
provided by statute, as in the case of certain mortgages .... (quoting Silverman v. Keal,
135 Pa. Super. 568, 570, 7 A.2d 57, 58 (1939)) (citations omitted) (emphasis
supplied by Liss court).
The Pennsylvania statute protects the holder of a first mortgage on real
property that is subjected to a sheriffs sale pursuant to a junior lienholder's
foreclosure action. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8152 (Purdon 1982). Section
8152 provides:
(a) General rule.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, a
judicial or other sale of real estate shall not affect the lien of a mortgage
thereon, if the lien of the mortgage is or shall be prior to all other liens
upon the same property except:
(1) Other mortgages, ground rents and purchase money due
the Commonwealth.
(2) Taxes, municipal claims and assessments, not at the date
of the mortgage duly entered as a lien in the office of the clerk of
the court of common pleas.
(3) Taxes, municipal claims and assessments whose lien
though afterwards accruing has by law priority given it.
(b) Property of a decedent, etc.-A judicial sale of the property
shall divest the lien of a mortgage to the extent authorized by the court
pursuant to the following provisions of Title 20 (relating to decedents,
estates and fiduciaries):
Section 3353 (relating to order of court).
Section 3357 (relating to title of purchaser).
(c) Sale on prior lien.-A judicial or other sale of real estate in
proceedings under a prior judgment or a prior ground rent, or in fore-
closure of a prior mortgage, shall discharge a mortgage later in lien.
(d) Unseated lands.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to mortgages
upon unseated lands or sales of unseated lands for taxes.
Id. Thus, the post-judgment notice of a foreclosure sale is more critical to the
holder of a junior mortgage whose lien is subject to discharge, than it is to the
holder of first mortgage, whose lien is protected by § 8152(a).
27. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAWV
§ 7.15, at 460-61 (1979) (discussing junior lienholder's role as participant in
foreclosure sale).
28. PA. R. Civ. P. 3136 governs the distribution of proceeds from the sher-
iffs sale of real property. See also PA. R. Civ. P. 3181(j). However, rule 3136
does not deal with priority of liens because priority is a matter of substantive law
and is beyond the competence of the Procedural Rules Committee. 9 GOODRICH
- AMRAM 2D § 3136:1, at 375 (Lawyers Co-op. 1977).
29. See, e.g'., Milstein v. S & K Co., 20 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 521, 525, 51 Pa. D.
7
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Because rule 3129 does not require that actual notice of a pending sher-
iff's sale be given to recorded lienholders,311 it may violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.
III. DEFINING A RELEVANT DUE PROCESS STANDARD: MULL4vE,
AI;I'.V.VoITE. Bo.iiD, FIRST PEAXS'L1'*.I BAVK, AND IA' RE
UP'SET SALE
The landmark United States Supreme Court case that subjected no-
tice requirements to judicial scrutiny under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment was Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 3 1
In Mullane, the Court held that before a state takes any steps that would
affect an interest in life, liberty, or property protected by the due pro-
cess clause, it must provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the ac-
tion and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. ' 13 2
In Mullane, the Court faced a challenge to the constitutional suffi-
ciencv of notice provided to beneficiaries upon settlement of accounts
by the trustee of a common trust fund.,"- The trustee had given notice
to the beneficiaries only by publication in a local newspaper in compli-
ance with the minimum requirements of New York law.3 4
& C.2d 339, 344 (1970) (junior lienholder claimed "it did not have actual notice
of the Imortgage f)reclosurel sale and it was due to that lack of actual notice that
resulted in Iits I failure to attend the sale and bid thereat to the extent of protect-
ing the purported lien"). For a further discussion of the junior lienholder's role
as participant in the foreclosure sale, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the notice that nst be given to lienholders under
rule 3129, see supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
31. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
32. /d. at 314 (citations omitted). The guarantees contained in the four-
teenth amendnent ap)ly only to governmental or "state" actions. Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 1I (1883). When real property is sold at a sherifFs sale to
satis[\ a state judgment pursuant to state procedural rules, there is "state" ac-
tion of a type regulated by the firteenth amendment. See, e,g-., M1ualle, 339
U.S. at 313 ("there can be no doubt that at a minimum Idue process] requirels]
that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case"): First Fed.
Say. & loan Ass'n v. Porter, 408 Pa. 236, 244, 183 A.2d 318, 324 (1962) (due
process requirements applied to execution sale); Scott v. Adal Corp., 11 Phila.
Co. Rep. 3, 6-7 (1984) (applying due process requirements to sheriffs sale on
execution nfjtulgment).
33. 339 U.S. at 307.
34. Id. at 309-10. At a proceeding for judicial settlement of the common
trtst fund account, the court-appointed representatlive of the beneficiaries with
an interest in the income of the fund appeared specially, contending that the
notice given and the slatutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were made-
cjuate to afford clue prOCCSs under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 310-11. In
overruling these objections, the surrogate court upheld the notice requirements.
Id. at 3 11. The Sutptreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, and the Court
of Appeals of ihe State of New York both alfirmecd the Surrogate Court's deci-
1198 [Vol. 30: p. 1191
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The Mullane Court recognized that "[t]he fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."' 35 The Court noted
that the right to be heard has little value unless a person is informed that
a matter affecting his or her interest is pending so the person can choose
for himself (herself) whether to appear.3" The Court explained that no-
tice by publication was not reasonably calculated to provide actual no-
tice of the pending settlement of accounts in Mullane and was therefore
insufficient to inform those who could be informed by more effective
means such as personal service or mailed notice.3 7 Based on this rea-
soning, the Mullane Court held that providing only published notice de-
prived those persons whose names and addresses were known of their
property rights without due process of law.3 8
The focus of the Mullane due process analysis is upon the "reasona-
bleness" of the means of notice required as a minimum by the state. 3'1 A
balance between the "interest of the State" and the "individual interest
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" is struck in de-
termining whether a particular method of notice is reasonable. 4 0 More
recently, in Mennonite Board, the Supreme Court of the United States re-
lied upon Mu/lane to hold that the holder of a recorded first mortgage is
entitled to personal service or mailed notice of ajudicial sale to satisfy a
defaulted state tax lien. 4 1
sion. Id. (citing 275 A.D. 769, 88 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1949); 299 N.Y. 697, 87 N.E.2d
73 (1949)).
35. Id. at 314 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
36. Id. at 314. The Court therefore required that a state provide notice that
reasonably conveys the required information so that interested persons may
make their appearance. Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 318. The Court explained:
Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an adver-
tisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if
he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper's normal circula-
tion the odds that the information will never reach him are large in-
deed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the
notice required does not even name those whose attention it is sup-
posed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to
attention. In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with
actual notice we are unable to regard this as more than a feint.
Id. at 315. The lallane Court therefore concluded that "[w]here the names and
post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons
disappear for resort to a means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its
pendency." Id. at 318. The Court, however, held that constructive notice by
publication was constitutionally sufficient for those beneficiaries whose "inter-
ests or whereabouts" were not known to the trustee. Id. at 317.
38. Id. at 320.
39. Id. at 315.
40. Id. at 314.
41. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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A. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams
In Mennonite Board, a mortgagor failed to pay local real estate taxes
on certain mortgaged property he owned.4 2 An Indiana county insti-
tuted proceedings to sell the property for nonpayment of taxes.43 At
the time,4 4 Indiana tax sale law required the state to give notice to the
"owner ' '4 5 of the property by certified mail, and to give notice to other
interested parties and the public by posting and publication. 4  Accord-
ingly, only the mortgagor received actual notice of the pending public
auction at which the property was to be sold.4 7 The mortgagee did not
see the posted and published notices of the sale48 and, consequently,
failed to attend the sale. 4 ' The mortgagee's interest in the property was
cut off when, after a two-year statutory period during which the mortga-
gee failed to redeem the property, the purchaser at the tax sale acquired
an estate in fee simple free of all liens .
5 1
42. Id. at 792. Under the terms of the mortgage agreement, the mortgagor
was responsible for payment of the property taxes. Id. In violation of this agree-
ment and without the mortgagee's knowledge, the mortgagor failed to pay the
property taxes. Id.
43. Id. Indiana law provided for the annual sale of real property on which
property taxes were overdue for 15 months or longer. Id. (citing IND. CODE
§§ 6-1.1-24-1 to -12 (1982)).
44. Id. at 792-93. The events in iMlennonile Board took place before 1980. Id.
45. Id. at 793 & n.I. Under Indiana law, a mortgagee has no title to the
mortgaged property and is not considered an "owner" for purposes of the appli-
cable Indiana statute. Id. at 793 n.l (citing First Sav. & Loan Assoc. of Cent.
Ind. v. Furnish, 174 Ind. App. 265, 272 n.14, 367 N.E.2d 596, 600 n.14 (1977)).
46. Id. at 793. (citing IND. CODE §§ 6-1.1-24-3 to -4 (1982)). In 1980, after
the events in question, Indiana added a provision requiring notice by certified
mail to any mortgagee of real property subject to tax sale proceedings. Id. at
793 n.2 (citing IND. CODE § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (1982)). Because the events in .lennon-
ite Board took place before this addition, the Court did not address the constitu-
tionality of this additional provision. Id. at 793 n.2.
47. Id. at 794. The mortgagor did not inform the mortgagee of the pend-
ing tax sale. Id.
48. 1I.
49. Id. Neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee appeared at the tax sale.
Id.
50. Id. at 793-94. Under Indiana laws at issue in Motemnnoite Board, a tax sale
of real property is followed by a two-year redemption period during which any
"person who has an interest in" the property may redeem the property. Id. at
793 (citing IND. CODE § 6-1.1-25-1 (1982)). During the redemption period, the
purchaser at the sale possesses a certificate of sale which constitutes a lien
against the real property for the entire purchase price and which is superior to
all other liens against the property that exist at the time the certificate is issued.
Id. at 793 (citing IND. CODE § 6-1.1-24-9 (1982)). After the redemption period
runs, the purchaser may apply to the county auditor for a deed to the property.
Id. at 794. The auditor must notify the former owner that he may still redeem
the property for an additional 30-day period. Id. (citing INt. CODE § 6-1.1-25-6
(1982)). The auditor is not required to notify any other persons with an interest
in the property. Id. at 793. If no one redeems the property within 30 days the
county auditor may then execute and deliver a deed to the property to the ptur-
chaser who acquires "an estate in fee simple absolute, free and clear of all liens
1200
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After obtaining a deed to the property, the purchaser brought suit
to quiet title. 5 1 In defense of its lien against the property, the mortga-
gee invoked the fourteenth amendment and contended that it had not
received constitutionally adequate notice of the pending tax sale.5 2 The
state trial court rejected the mortgagee's constitutional challenge and
quieted title to the purchaser, thereby extinguishing the mortgagee's in-
terest in the property. 53 The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed.
54
In reversing the state court's decision, the United States Supreme
Court relied on Mu/lane55 for the proposition that the due process clause
and encumbrances." Id. at 794 (quoting IND. CODE § 5-1.1-25-4(d) (1982)). The
purchaser may then initiate an action to quiet his title to the property. Id. (citing
IND. CODE § 6-1.1-25-14 (1982)).
After the Indiana two-year statutory redemption period had run the mortga-
gee in Mennonite Board finally learned that the property in which it had an interest
had been sold. Id. at 794. The mortgagor had continued to make payments on
the mortgage and, as a result, the mortgagee did not realize that the property
had been sold. Id.
51. Id. at 795.
52. Id. The mortgagee also contended that it had not received constitution-
ally adequate notice of its opportunity under Indiana law to redeem the property
following the sale. Id. The mortgagee asserted these challenges in opposition
to the purchaser's successful motion for summary judgment. Id. For a discus-
sion of the right to redeem under the Indiana tax sale law, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
53. 462 U.S. at 794.
54. Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Ind. App. -, 427 N.E.2d 686, 687 (1981). On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. 459 U.S. 903 (1982).
55. 462 U.S. at 798-800 (quoting iMlullane, 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950)).
For a discussion of Mullane, see supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
The Ilennonite Board Court observed the Supreme Court's unwaivering ad-
herence to the Mullane principle in subsequent cases. 462 U.S. at 797 (citing
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 453-56 (1982) (posted notice on tenant's
apartment door held inadequate means of providing notice of forcible entry and
detainer action); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-15
(1978) (due process requires municipal utility to notify customer of available
procedure for protesting termination); Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 174-77 (1974) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) requires individual
notice to all class members whose names and addresses may be ascertained
through reasonable effort); Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 102 (1966)
(act of filing involuntary petition in bankruptcy per se was not reasonably calcu-
lated to put bank on notice of the bankruptcy); Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208, 211-12 (1962) (notice by publication in newspaper and by posting
of handbills was inadequate to apprise property owner, whose name and address
were ascertainable from deed records and tax rolls, of condemnation proceed-
ings); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (notice of con-
demnation proceedings published in local newspaper was inadequate method of
informing landowner whose name was known to city and on official records);
Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1956) (notice to person known
to be unprotected incompetent and unable to understand proceedings against
her property was insufficient to provide due process); City of New York v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1953) (publication of bar order in
newspapers not reasonable notice to known creditor, New York City)).
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of the fourteenth amendment requires a state to provide "notice reason-
ably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested par-
ties" of a pending state action that will affect a protected life, liberty, or
property interest.5 1 Turning to the facts before it, the Mennonite Board
Court found that a mortgagee possesses a "substantial property inter-
est" in the mortgaged property, and that this interest is significantly af-
fected by a tax sale. 57 Reasoning that a mortgagee therefore possesses a
constitutionally protected property interest, the Court held that a mort-
gagee "is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise [it] of a
pending tax sale." 58
Addressing the type of notice required, the Court determined that
when a mortgagee is identified in a recorded mortgage, notice by publi-
cation is insufficient and "must be supplemented by notice mailed to the
mortgagee's last known available address or by personal service. ' ' M'
The Court further ruled that constructive notice by publication and
posting is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process except
in cases where the identity of the mortgagee may not be reasonably dis-
covered.6t1 Clarifying what it meant by reasonably discoverable, the
Court stressed that its decision did not require "a governmental body
. . . to undertake extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and
whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public rec-
ord."' ' Finally, the Court observed that "[n]otice by mail or other
56. 462 U.S. at 795 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314) (citations omitted).
For the pertinent language of the fourteenth amendment, see supra note 4.
57. 462 U.S. at 798. The purchaser at an Indiana tax sale is initially granted
a lien with priority over that of all other creditors. Id. The Court noted that the
purchaser's superior lien initially diminishes the value of the mortgagee's secuir-
ity interest. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that the mortgagee's interest ulti-
mately may be extinguished by the tax sale because the purchaser receives title
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances at the end of Indiana's statutory
redemption period. Id. For a discussion of the redemption procedures under
Indiana law, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
58. 462 U.S. at 798.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court recognized that the lemnite Board mortgage on file with
the county recorder identified the mortgagee only by name. Id. at 798 n.4. Nev-
ertheless the Court assumed that the county could have ascertained the mortga-
gee's address through "reasonably diligent efforts." Id. (citing JIiulrane, 339 U.S.
at 317). The Mullane Court had held that notice by publication alone is sufficient
for "[tihose beneficiaries ... whose interests or whereabouts could not with due
diligence be ascertained .... " 339 U.S. at 317.
61. 462 U.S. at 798 n.4. By this statement, the Court "suggest[ed] that the
State is required to make some effort 'to discover the identity and the wherea-
bouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public record.' " Id. at 805
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 462 U.S. at 798 n.4).
The Court found the state's notice requirements unreasonable with regard
to a recorded mortgagee where "an inexpensive and efficient mechanism such as
mail service is available." Id. at 799 (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444,
455 (1982)). The Court explained that the state has a constitutional obligation
to provide personal service or mailed notice to inform a known mortgagee of
1202 [Vol. 30: p. 1191
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means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional
precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or
property interest of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in com-
mercial practice, if its name and address are reasonable ascertain-
able."'"52 Because the Indiana statute did not require that actual notice
be given to the recorded mortgagee, the Court held that the statute did
not meet the requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and accordingly reversed the judgment of the Indiana
Court of Appeals.
6 3
In a dissenting opinion, 6 4 Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's
holding as "unwarranted both as a general rule and as the rule of [jAen-
nonite Board]."65 According to Justice O'Connor, the majority's holding
ran counter to the Court's longstanding refusal to commit itself to a set
formula for achieving a balance between the competing interests of the
state and the individual.(" Justice O'Connor also found a conflict be-
tween the Court's previous holdings and what Justice O'Connor re-
pending tax sale proceedings, notwithstanding the Court's recognition that
mortgagees are generally sophisticated creditors who have ways of discovering
whether property taxes have not been paid and, therefore, whether tax sale pro-
ceedings are likely to be initiated. Id. The Court stressed that "a party's ability
to safeguard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obliga-
tion." Id. Moreover, the Court stated that "a mortgagee's knowledge of delin-
quency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is
pending." Id.
62. Id. (emphasis in original).
63. Id. The Court remanded the judgment for "further proceedings not
inconsistent with [its] opinion." Id.
64. Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissenting
opinion was joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Id.
65. Id. Justice O'Connor read the majority opinion as "holdlingl that
before the State conducts any proceeding that will affect the legally protected
property interests of any party, the State must provide notice to that party by
means certain to ensure actual notice as long as the party's identity and location
are 'reasonably ascertainable.' " Id. (citing 462 U.S. at 800) (emphasis supplied
by Justice O'Connor). Justice O'Connor found the Court's "broad rule" incon-
sistent with the AIullane principle that constitutionally adequate notice has been
given when "the practicalities and peculiarities of the case . . .are reasonably
met." Id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting .liullame, 339 U.S. at 314-
15) (further citations omitted).
66. Id. at 801. Justice O'Connor noted that "[w]hether a particular method
of notice is reasonable depends upon the outcome of the balance between the
'interest of the State' and 'the individual interest sought to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' " Id. (quoting Mhllaiie, 339 U.S. at 314). Justice
O'Connor stated that "[firom idullane on, the Court had adamantly refused to
commit 'itself to any formula achieving a balance between these interests in a
particular proceeding or determining when constructive notice may be utilized
or what test it must meet.' " Id. at 801-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). Moreover, Justice O'Connor observed that the state
has the primary responsibility for balancing the competing interests and that the
Court would interfere with the state's balancing decision only if it was irrational.
Id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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garded as a pronouncement by the majority that constructive notice is
never sufficient, a rule that is "ostensibly applicable whenever any legally
protected property interest may be adversely affected."
7
Justice O'Connor also objected to the majority's suggestion that
states make a reasonable effort to ascertain the identity and whereabouts
of mortgagees who are not identified in the public record."" Justice
O'Connor disagreed with the majority on this point in two ways. First,
she found it too great a departure from past precedent, and second, she
found it too ambiguous. '! Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that if the
Court had followed the mandate of Mullane by balancing the state's and
the mortgagee's interests, the Indiana notice statute would have been
upheld.
7 0
67. Id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by Justice
O'Connor). Justice O'Connor noted that in Alullane the Court held that
"[p]ersonal service has not in all circumstances been regarded as indispensible
to the process due to residents, and it has more often been held unnecessary as
to nonresidents." Id. at 802 n. 1 (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (quoting .1ldlane, 339
U.S. at 314).
68. Id. at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of the
positions of the majority and dissent in this regard, see supra note 61 and accom-
panying text.
69. 462 U.S. at 805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also dis-
sented because the Court's decision as applied to the specific facts of Meonite
Board was in conflict with the Court's prior decisions and the balancing of inter-
ests called for by Mlullaue. Id. For a discussion of the balancing test that Justice
O'Connor found to be required by Alullane, see supra note 66 and accompanying
text.
70. 462 U.S. at 805-06 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor identi-
fied the state's interests as collecting its tax revenues and avoiding the burden
the majority imposed by requiring the state to "exercise 'reasonable' efforts to
ascertain the identity and location of any party with a legally protectable inter-
est." Id. at 806 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Against these state interests, Justice
O'Connor weighed the interest of mortgagees. Id. at 806-07 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Contrary to the approach of the majority, Justice O'Connor consid-
ered the ability of mortgagees to protect their interest as a relevant factor in the
Mullane balancing test. Id. at 807 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Finding tax assess-
ment and tax sales to be regular and predictable events, Justice O'Connor rea-
soned that mortgagees could protect their property interests with "a minimum
amount of effort." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor concluded
that
[w]hen a party is unreasonable in failing to protect its interest despite
its ability to do so, due process does not require that the State save the
party from its own lack of care. The balance required by .ullane clearly
weighs in favor of finding that the Indiana Statutes satisfied the require-
ments of due process.
Id. at 809 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the majority's opposing view regarding consideration of
a party's ability to protect its interest, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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B. First Pennsylvania Bank v. Lancaster Tax Claim Bureau
The Mennonite Board decision had an immediate impact upon a
Pennsylvania case that was on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court when Mennonite Board was decided. 7 1 First Pennsylvania Bank v.
Lancaster Tax Claim Bureau7 2 raised the issue of whether published and
posted notice provides a mortgagee with constitutionally sufficient no-
tice of a state tax sale of mortgaged property. 73 Because the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's decision in First Pennsylvania Bank was
inconsistent with Mennonite Board, the United States Supreme Court va-
cated the state judgment and remanded for further consideration in
light of Mennonite Board.74
In First Pennsylvania Bank, a mortgagee sought to set aside a sale of
real property by the Lancaster County Tax Claim Bureau to satisfy de-
linquent taxes 75 pursuant to the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale
71. The Mennonite Board holding has been applied by several lower federal
courts. See, e.g., United States v. 125.2 Acres of Land, 732 F.2d 239, 241-42 (1st
Cir. 1984) (relying on Mennonite Board and Mullane to decide that government
notice by posting and publishing was constitutionally inadequate as to land-
owner whose name and town were known); Kemmerer Coal Co. v. Brigham
Young Univ., 723 F.2d 54, 57 & n. 1 (10th Cir. 1983) (although petitioner's pred-
ecessor may have been deprived of property without due process under Mennon-
ite Board, court refused to allow petitioner to assert third party's constitutional
rights); Clark v. Brewer, 578 F. Supp. 1501, 1511-12 (S.D. Iowa 1983) (relying
on Mennonite Board to require state penetentiary to provide inmates with written
notice of closed management review hearings that are not part of regular weekly
schedule or at which new evidence is to be presented or whenever a week passes
without a regular meeting, because such hearings affect liberty interest pro-
tected by due process clause), anended sub nom. Clark v. Nix, 578 F. Supp. 1515
(S.D. Iowa 1984), affd as moddred by Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.
1985); Harris v. Gaul, 572 F. Supp. 1554, 1559-61 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (relying on
Mennonite Board and Mullane to hold that vendee under land contract has prop-
erty interest protected under due process clause and must be given actual notice
of pending sale when interest is publicly recorded).
72. 463 U.S. 1201 (1983), vacating 498 Pa. 122, 445 A.2d 97 (1982), on re-
mand, 504 Pa. 179, 470 A.2d 938 (1983).
73. 504 Pa. at 181, 470 A.2d at 939 ("[T]he first question presented on
remand is whether the notice provision . . . which does not require either per-
sonal service or notice by mail to a record mortgagee of an impending tax sale,
violates . . . due process.").
74. 463 U.S. 1201 (1983). In addition, a Nevada case also was remanded to
the state supreme court for further consideration in light of Mennonite Board. See
Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983), vacating 98 Nev. 476, 653
P.2d 158 (1982), on remand, - Nev. -, 683 P.2d 20 (1984). In Moselev, a creditor
of an estate claimed that an estate's notice of probate proceedings by publica-
tion was insufficient to comply with the process due to a known claimant. -
Nev. at -, 683 P.2d at 20-21. On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court relied on
Mennonite Board and Mullane in concluding that where the estate has actual notice
of a creditor's claim against the decedent, the estate must provide the claimant
more notice than mere service by publication. Id. at -, 683 P.2d at 21.
75. 504 Pa. at 181, 470 A.2d at 939. In addition to setting aside the tax
sale, the mortgagee sought to cancel the deed to the tax sale purchaser and to
reinstate the first mortgage it held on the property, which had been discharged
15
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Law. 76 Adhering to the provisions of the applicable statute, 77 the tax
by the tax sale. Id. The mortgage in question was one of five mortgages which
secured a loan by the mortgagee bank to a construction company. Id. at 182,
470 A.2d at 939-40. Because of errors in identifying tax receipts at the closing
and subsequent confusion in this regard, at the time the bank recorded its mort-
gage delinquent taxes had become a lien on the property and, therefore, the
bank's mortgage lien was junior to the tax lien. Id., 470 A.2d at 940. The tax
delinquency continued, and the property was sold at a tax sale. Id. at 183, 470
A.2d at 940. Accordingly, the bank's mortgage lien was discharged by the tax
sale pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.609 (Purdon 1968) (amended
1984). 504 Pa. at 182, 470 A.2d at 940. Section 5860.609 provides:
Every such sale shall discharge the lien of every obligation, claim,
lien or estate with which said property may have or shall become
charged, or for which it may become liable, except no such sale shall
discharge the lien of any ground or mortgage which shall have been
recorded before such taxes became liens, and which is or shall be prior
to all other liens, except other mortgages and ground rents.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.609 (Purdon 1968). Section 5860.609 has since
been amended to convey title subject to liens of all recorded obligations. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.609 (Purdon Supp. 1985). After the tax sale, the tax
claim bureau executed a deed to the purchaser pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 5860.615 (Purdon 1968). Section 5860.615 provides:
When the price for the private sale of any said property has been
finally approved or confirmed, as hereinbefore provided, the bureau
shall upon payment over the purchase price less the option money, if
any, make to the purchaser, his or their heirs or assigns, a deed in fee
simple for the property sold. Each such deed shall be in the name of
the bureau, as trustee grantor and shall be executed and duly acknowl-
edged before the prothonotary by the director. Such deed shall convey
title to the purchaser free, clear and discharged of all tax claims and tax
judgments, whether or not returned, filed or entered, as provided by
this or any other act.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 6850.615 (Purdon 1968).
For a further discussion of the errors regarding the tax receipts in First Penn-
sylvania Bank, see infra note 80 and accompanying text.
76. Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§§ 5860.101-.803 (Purdon 1968 & Supp. 1985).
77. The notice provisions in effect at the time of the tax sale were governed
by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.602 (Purdon 1968), as amended by Act of Sept.
27, 1973, 1973 Pa. Laws 264. 504 Pa. at 184 & n.3, 470 A.2d at 940 & n.3.
Section 5860.602 provided in pertinent part:
Prior to any scheduled sale the bureau shall give notice thereof,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation in the county, if so many are published therein, and
once in the legal journal, if any, designated by the court for the publica-
tion of legal notices. Such notice shall set forth (a) the purposes of
such sale, (b) the time of such sale, (c) the place of such sale, (d) the
terms of the sale including the approximate upset price, (e) the descrip-




Where the owner is unknown and has been unknown for a period
of not less than ten years, the name of the owner need not be included
in such description.
The description may be given in intelligible abbreviations.
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claim bureau gave notice of the pending sale by publishing an advertise-
ment of the sale once a week for three consecutive weeks in a local news-
paper, and by publishing an advertisement in the local legal publication
one week before the scheduled sale. 7 8 The property was sold 7 9 without
Such published notice shall be addressed to the "owners of
properties described in this notice and to all persons having tax liens,
tax judgments or municipal claims against such properties".
In addition to such publications, similar notice of the sale shall also
be given by the bureau, at least ten (10) days before the date of the sale,
by United States certified mail, personal addressee only, return receipt
requested, postage prepaid, to each owner as defined by this act and by
posting on the property.
The published notice, the mail notice and the posted notice shall
each state that the sale of any property may, at the option of the bu-
reau, be stayed if the owner thereof or any lien creditor of the owner on
or before the date of sale enters into an agreement with the bureau to
pay the taxes in installments, in the manner provided by this act, and
the agreement entered into.
In case the property of any corporation, limited partnership or
joint-stock association is advertised for sale, the bureau shall give to the
Department of Revenue the notice required by section one thousand
four hundred two of the Fiscal Code of the ninth day of April, one
thousand nine hundred twenty-nine (Pamphlet Laws 343).
No sale shall be defeated and no title to property shall be invali-
dated because of proof that mail notice as herein required was not re-
ceived by the owner, provided such notice was given as prescribed by
this section.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 § 5860.602 (Purdon 1968), as amended by, Act of Sept. 27,
1973, 1973 Pa. Laws 264 (citations and footnotes omitted). For a discussion of
§ 5860.602 as applied in First Pennsylvania Bank, see infra note 81 and accompa-
nying text. Section 5860.602 has since been amended to provide for thirty (30)
days notice before the date of the sale, a provision for return receipt by the
owner, and a general warning which must be contained in the notice of sale. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.602 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
78. 504 Pa. at 183-84 & n.3, 470 A.2d at 940 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 5860.602 (Purdon 1968)).
79. An attorney purchased the property at the tax sale as agent for his
mother, the appellee, for $854.88, the upset price. 504 Pa. at 183, 470 A.2d at
940. The Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster Countv found that the fair mar-
ket value of the property at the time of the sale was $185,000. Id. The upset sale
price was fixed by the tax bureau pursuant to the relevant statute, § 5860.605,
which provides in pertinent part:
The bureau shall fix as the upset price to be realized at the sale of
any property upon a claim absolute, the sum of (a) the tax liens of the
Commonwealth, (b) the amount of the claim absolute and interest
thereon on which the sale is being held, (c) the amount of any other tax
claim or tax judgment due on such property and interest on the judg-
ment to the date of sale, (d) the amount of all accrued taxes including
taxes levied for the current year, whether or not returned, a record of
which shall be furnished to the bureau of tax collectors, receivers of
taxes and taxing districts, (e) the amount of the municipal claims
against the property, and (f) the record costs and costs of sale, includ-
ing pro rata costs of the publication of notice and costs of mail and
posted notices in connection with the return of the claim and mail and
posted notices of sale.
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the mortgagee being present."" In its suit to set aside this sale, the
mortgagee argued that the notice provision of the Pennsylvania Real Es-
tate Tax Sale Law was unconstitutional because it did not require the tax
bureau to give personal or mailed notice of a pending tax sale to a mort-
gagee of record. 8 1 The mortgagee's complaint was dismissed by the
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.605 (Purdon 1968).
80. 504 Pa. at 183, 470 A.2d at 940. The mortgagee did not receive per-
sonal or mailed notice of the sale, and, apparently, learned of the sale after the
statutory redemption period had run. Id. (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 5860.501 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984)). Section 5860.501(a) provides:
(a) Any owner, his heirs or legal representatives, or any lien credi-
tors, his heirs, assigns or legal representative, or other person inter-
ested, if such other person has a duly executed power of attorney from
the owner, his heirs or assigns or legal representative or any of them
empowering such person to make payment may, within one (1) year
after the first day of July of the year in which the claim was filed and
notice given, if the notice was mailed prior to August first, or within
one year from the first day of the month in which the notice was mailed,
if mailed on or after August first, redeem such property for the benefit
of the owner by payment to the bureau of the amount of the aforesaid
claim and interest thereon, the amount of any other tax claim or tax
judgment due on such property and interest thereon, and the amount
of all accrued taxes which remain unpaid, the record costs, including
pro rata costs of the notice or notice given in connection with the re-
turns or claims.
The bureau shall receive and receipt for said payments, and shall
make distribution thereof to the taxing districts entitled thereto. The
bureau shall forthwith acknowledge the receipt of the redemption mon-
eys by entering satisfaction on the record of the claim in the office of
the bureau which shall be signed by the director.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
Sections 5860.501(b)-(c) provide:
(b) When any property is so redeemed by a lien creditor, or his
heirs, assigns or legal representatives, or by any person interested for
the benefit of the owner, the bureau shall issue to the person redeem-
ing such property a certificate, stating the fact of such redemption, a
brief description of the property redeemed, and the amount of the re-
demption money paid, which certificate may be entered in the office of
the prothonotary of the county as a judgment against the owner of the
property for the amount stated therein. The lien of any such judgment
shall have priority over all other liens against such property in the same
manner and to the same extent as the taxes involved in the redemption.
(c) There shall be no redemption of any property after the sale
thereof.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.501(b)-(c) (Purdon 1968).
81. 504 Pa. at 184, 470 A.2d at 940. For the text of the notice provision in
effect at the time of First Pennsylvania Bank, see supra note 77. Although property
owners are provided notice by mail under the statute, First Pennsylvania Bank
conceded that mortgagees such as itself were not "owners" within the statutory
definition applicable to § 5860.602, the notice provision. 504 Pa. at 185, 470
A.2d at 941 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.102 (Purdon 1968)). Section
5860.102 defines "owner" as:
the person in whose name the property is last registered, if registered
according to law, and in all other cases means any person in open,
peaceable and notorious possession of the property, as apparent owner
1208
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Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, which decision was then
affirmed by the same court sitting en banc, and affirmed by the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court. 8 2 The case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court which vacated the order of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and remanded the record to that court for further con-
sideration in light of its holding in Mennonite Board.8
3
On remand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the no-
tice provisions of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale Law were
"plainly unconstitutional" under the standard set forth in Mennonite
Board.8 4 Recognizing that the issue before it was identical to the issue in
Mennonite Board, the court ruled that the Pennsylvania notice statute
failed to meet the Mennonite Board standard because the statute required
actual notice by personal service or mailed notice only to "owners"
8 5 of
the subject real property and not to holders of recorded mortgages on
the property.8"
or owners thereof, or the reputed owner or owners thereof, in the
neighborhood of such property; as to property having been turned over
to the bureau by any county, "owner" shall mean the county.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.102 (Purdon 1968).
82. 504 Pa. at 181, 470 A.2d at 939.
83. 463 U.S. 1201 (1983).
84. 504 Pa. at 181,470 A.2d at 939. The tax bureau argued on remand that
even if the notice provisions were unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania Deficiency
Judgment Act divested the mortgagee's interest in the property. Id. at 187, 470
A.2d at 942 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103 (Purdon 1982)). Addressing
this claim, two of the seven Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices found the Defi-
ciency Judgment Act inapplicable to the facts of First Pennsylvania Bank. Id. at
190, 470 A.2d at 944. Four of the justices, finding the constitutional issue dis-
positive, refused to reach the deficiency judgment act issue, rendering to dicta
the discussion of this issue in the opinion announcing the court's judgment. Id.
at 191, 470 A.2d at 944 (ZappalaJ., concurring). One justice concurred in the
result without filing an opinion. Id. at 191, 470 A.2d at 944 (Roberts, C.J., con-
curring in result).
For two articles which discuss the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act
and this aspect of First Penns 'ylvania Bank, see Ominsky, Deficiency Judgnents in
Pemsylvania-The Lender's Gauntlet Revisited, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1130 (1985); Sirico,
Ijiicieny'Jdginents in Pennsylvania-A Reply, 30 VILL. L. REv. 1152 (1985).
85. For the statutory definition of "owner", see supra note 81 and accompa-
nying text.
86. 504 Pa. at 185, 470 A.2d at 941. The court stated that it was bound to
follow 1ennonite Board by reason of the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2). The supremacy clause pro-
vides in pertinent part that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, § 2.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected the tax sale purchaser's argu-
ment that First Pennsylvania Bank was distinguishable from Mlennonite Board be-
cause the lien divestiture provisions of the Indiana statute discharged all
mortgages, whenever recorded, whereas the Pennsylvania statute discharged
only those mortgages recorded after the tax lien had' attached. 504 Pa. at 185,
1985] COMMENT 1209
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did, however, have difficulty
with the statement of the Mennonite Board majority that the mortgagee's
ability to safeguard its property interest did "not relieve the State of its
constitutional obligation."'8 7 Taking issue with the Supreme Court's
ruling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court argued that "[m]ortgagees as a
class, generally, may well be sophisticated creditors" with adequate re-
sources to protect their interests,8" and therefore the published notice
provided for by the Pennsylvania statute should pass constitutional mus-
ter because it is reasonably calculated to inform mortgagees of sched-
uled tax sales. :  Nevertheless, the court felt constrained by Mennonite
470 A.2d at 941. For the text of the Pennsylvania lien divestiture provision con-
sidered in First Pemsylvania Bank, see supra note 75. For a discussion of the Indi-
ana lien divestiture provisions considered by the United States Supreme Court
in Vemionite Board, see supra note 50. The First Pennsylvania Bank purchaser thus
argued that the mortgagee had received constitutionally sufficient constructive
notice of the tax lien from the record of taxes returned as liens on the affected
property. 504 Pa. at 185-86, 470 A.2d at 941.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that although the mortgagee had
record and actual notice of the tax lien, it had failed to take appropriate action to
protect its interest in the real estate because of its mistaken belief that the mort-
gagor's attorney had paid the taxes owed on the property. Id. at 186, 470 A.2d
at 941-42. For a discussion of the mortgagee's notice of the tax lien, see spra
note 75 and accompanying text. The court then recognized that the mortga-
gee's lack of knowledge of the subsequent tax sale could be attributed to the
mortgagor's attorney's actions and not to the inadequacies of the Pennsylvania
Real Estate Act's notice provision. 504 Pa. at 186-87, 470 A.2d at 942.
The mortgagor's attorney had paid bills for real estate taxes owed on a tract
of land that was adjacent to the tract at issue in First Pennsylvania Bank and that
was owned by a corporation in which the mortgagor was the sole shareholder,
under the mistaken belief that the attorney was paying back taxes on the subject
property. Id. at 183, 470 A.2d at 940. The attorney never inquired as to the title
designation on the receipts for the tax payme-nts, which showed the map number
for the adjoining tract. Id. In addition, the attorney never identified the prop-
erty by description and map number when he made tax payments to the Lancas-
ter County Tax Claim Bureau. Id. As a result, there was continuing tax
delinquency on the subject property. Id.
Despite the possibility that the mortgagee's lack of knowledge of the tax sale
was attributable to the actions of the mortgagor's attorney, and not to the inade-
quacies of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Act's notice provision, the Penn-
sylvania notice provision was not saved because the Memnonite Board Court had
stated that a mortgagee's knowledge of delinquent tax payments is not
equivalent to notice of a pending tax sale. Id. at 186, 470 A.2d at 942 (citing
lliennonite Board, 462 U.S. at 798). For the .MIentonite Board Court's statement in
this regard, see sipra note 61 and accompanying text.
87. 504 Pa. at 187, 470 A.2d at 942 (quoting Mennonite Board, 462 U.S. at
799). For a discussion of the Illennonite Board majority's position in this regard,
see smpra note 61. For a discussion of the .Iemnonite Board dissent's disagreement
with the majority on this issue, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
88. 504 Pa. at 186, 470 A.2d at 942 (citing IMnonite Board, 462 U.S. at 803
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)). For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's position on
this issue, see sn/a note 70 and accompanying text.
89. 504 Pa. at 186, 470 A.2d at 942. In the opinion of the PennsNlvania
Supreme Court, this was especially true in light of the fact that "the United
States Supreme Court itself has held that it is not its responsibility to prescribe
1210
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Board to hold the notice statute unconstitutional." °
C. In Re Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks County
The notice protections that Mennonite Board!'" and First Pennsylvania
Bank) 2 guaranteed to mortgagees were extended to judgment creditors
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Upset Sale.9 3 In re Upset Sale
involved a dispute about a parcel of real property which had been en-
cumbered by two recorded judgment liens and by subsequent tax liens
resulting from two years of unpaid county, municipal, and school
taxes. 94 The parties to the dispute were the holders of the two judg-
ment liens: the Nolfs (appellants) and the estate of Schumo (appel-
lee) .95 The local tax claim bureau notified the landowner that claims had
been entered against her for nonpayment of taxes and further advised
her of a one-year redemption period during which she could pay the
claim.'" The notice also provided that if the claim was not paid before
the end of the redemption period the property would be sold at a judi-
cial sale which would preclude further redemption. 9 7 The landowner
did not redeem the property and the tax claim bureau published notice
of the pending tax sale pursuant to the notice provisions of the Penn-
sylvania Real Estate Tax Sale Law."'8
The property was sold to the Nolfs at the tax sale, and the sale was
the precise manner of notice that [the] Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] must
adopt." Id. (citing Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 n.9 (1982)). The court
explained:
For I the above] reasons, we, like the dissenters in the ]Mennonite Board]
Court, are troubled by the statements of that court's majority that "a
party's ability to take steps to safeguard its interests does not relieve the
State of its constitutional obligation" aiid that a state may not "forego
even the relative' modest administrative burden of providing notice by
mail to parties who are particularly resourceful."
Id. at 187, 470 A.2d at 942 (quoting .Vmoionite Board, 462 U.S. at 799) (emphasis
added by the Fits/ Penns l'ania Bank court).
90. Id. For a discussion of the court's inability to avoid the control of .en-
tionite Board, see snpra note 86 and accompanying text.
91. For a discussion of.llennonite Board, see supra notes 42-70 and accompa-
Iving text.
92. For a discussion of First Pennsylvania Bank, see supra notes 71-90 and
accompanying text.
93. 505 Pa. 327, 479 A.2d 940 (1984).




98. Id. The notice provision in effect at the time of the tax sale was PA.
STrr. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.602 (Purdon 1968), as amended bY Act of Sept. 27,
1973, 1973 la. Laws 264. This was the same provision held to be unconstitu-
tional by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in First Pennsvhvania Bank, 504 Pa. at
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confirmed by court decree. 99 The estate of Schumo filed objections to
the tax sale contending that it should not be bound by the sale because it
had not received notice of it. °° Agreeing with the estate, the court of
common pleas invalidated the tax sale and held unconstitutional the no-
tice provisions of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale Law on the
ground that they deprived judgment creditors of their property rights
without due process.""
On direct appeal by the Nolfs,10 2 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania first stated that "[a]ny judicial proceeding which impairs or di-
minishes the value and reach of the judgment certainly affects its holder
adversely."' 0 3 The court then found that a tax sale is such a proceed-
ing. 10 4 Examining the language of Mennonite Board, the court found that
judgment liens, as well as first mortgages, fall within the protections of
the due process clause because they all constitute protected property
interests. 105
99. 505 Pa. at 331, 479 A.2d at 942. The property was sold at a tax sale on
September 10, 1979, and the sale was confirmed by decree nisi on October 31,
1979. Id.
100. Id. at 332, 479 A.2d at 942. The notice provision in effect at the time
of the tax sale, § 5860.602, did not require that the Berks County Tax Claim
Bureau give either personal or mailed notice of the pending tax sale to the ap-
pellee-judgment creditor. 505 Pa. at 332 & n.2, 479 A.2d at 942 & n.2. For the
text of § 5860.602 at the time of the sale, see supra note 77.
101. 505 Pa. at 332, 479 A.2d at 942. The Court of Common Pleas of Berks
County held that judgment creditors could be deprived of a "valuable property
right" without due process of law because they were deprived of notice of tax
sales by § 5680.602. Id.
102. The Nolfs appealed the order to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court, which transferred the appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court because
of the constitutional issue presented. Id. at 332 n. 1, 479 A.2d at 942 n. 1. After
the court of common pleas invalidated the tax sale, the estate, as a judgment
lienor, had a writ of execution issued against the property owner directing the
sheriff to sell the subject property. Id. at 332, 479 A.2d at 942. The trial court
stayed the sale twice in order to permit the Nolfs to intervene and to post secur-
ity bond for any loss to the estate caused by the stay. Id. Because the Nolfs did
not meet the conditions of the stay order, the sheriff sold the property to the
estate. Id. [he Nolfs claimed entitlement to the proceeds of the sale and at-
tempted to have the sheriffs deed impounded, but the trial court dismissed both
claims. Id. The Nolfs appealed the dismissal to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered the appeal to be trans-
ferred and consolidated with the Nolfs' first appeal which was before it. Id.
103. Id. at 335-36, 479 A.2d at 944. Regarding the interest of a judgment
creditor, the court stated that "[while judgment creditors have neither estate
nor right in the lands of their debtor, it has never been the law that they do not
have a protectable property interest." Id. at 335, 479 A.2d at 944 (citation
omitted).
104. Id. at 336, 479 A.2d at 944.
105. Id. (citing .Iemonite Board, 462 U.S. at 798). The In re Upset Sale court
explained that both mortgages and judgments are liens: mortgages are specific
security interests that attach to specific assets; judgments are general security
interests that attach to all the debtor's real property within thejurisdiction of the
court where the judgment is recorded. The judgment creditor, unlike the mort-
1212
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 5 [1985], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss5/8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then reviewed the applicable no-
tice provisions of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale Law to deter-
mine whether they met the requirements of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 01 Pennsylvania law only required the tax
claim bureau to notify lien holders of a tax sale by publishing advertise-
ments of the sale in a newspaper of general circulation and in the county
legal journal listing the property for sale and addressing notice to the
"owners of properties described in th[e] notice and to all persons having
tax liens, tax judgments or municipal claims against such properties." 107
gagee who has a specific lien on specific real property, has no interest in the
property itself, but only in his "general" lien and in the right to satisfaction of
his judgment out of the debtor's property. Id. The court found that both spe-
cific and general security interests or liens are entitled to the protection of the
due process requirements. Id. (citing Mennonite Board, 462 U.S. at 791; First
Pennsylvania Bank, 504 Pa. at 180, 470 A.2d at 938). For a discussion of Mennonite
Board, see supra notes 42-70 and accompanying text. For a discussion of First
Penns',lvania Bank, see supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
106. 505 Pa. at 936-38, 479 A.2d at 944-45.
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.602 (Purdon 1968), as anended by Act of
Sept. 27, 1973, 1973 Pa. Laws 264. For the text of § 5860.602 at the time of the
tax sale, see supra note 77. Pennsylvania law gave lienholders the right to re-
deem the property before a tax sale for the benefit of the property owner. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.501 (Purdon 1968 & Supp. 1985). For the text of
§ 5860.501, see supra note 80.
Pennsylvania law also gave lienholders the right to file objections to a tax
sale for a limited period of time after the sale. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.607
(Purdon 1968). Section 5860.607 provided in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be the duty of the bureau, not later than sixty (60) days
after a scheduled sale was held, to make a consolidated return to the
court of common pleas of the county, wherein it shall set forth, (i) a
brief description of each property exposed to sale, (2) the name of the
owner in whose name it was assessed, (3) the name of the owner at the
time of sale, and to whom notice by mail was given as provided by this
act, (4) a reference to the record of the tax claim on which the sale was
held, (5) the time when and the newspapers in which the advertisement
for sale was made, with a copy of said advertisements, (6) the time of
sale, (7) the name of the purchaser, if any, and (8) the price for which
each property was sold, or that no bid was made equal to the upset
price and the property was sold. Upon presentation of said return, if it
shall appear to said court that such sale has been regularly conducted
tinder the provisions of this act, the said return and the sales so made
shall be confirmed nisi.
(b) The bureau shall, at the expense of the county, within ten (10)
days after confirmation nisi of the return, publish a general notice once
in a newspaper of general circulation published in the county, and in
the legal journal, if any, designated by rules of court for the publication
of legal notices, stating (1) that the return of the bureau with respect to
any such sale for taxes has been presented to the court. (2) giving the
date of such presentation, and (3) that objections or exceptions thereto
may be filed by any owner or lien creditor within sixty (60) days after
the date of the return, otherwise the return will be confirmed
absolutely.
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Pennsylvania law, therefore, required only that constructive notice of tax
sales be given to judgment creditors.10 8 Reviewing these requirements,
the court determined that lack of personal or mailed notice to the judg-
ment creditor could impair the value of the creditor's judgment because
the creditor "would have no real opportunity to redeem the property,
S.. bid at the tax sale, or assert any defects of the sale." 1°9 Moreover,
the court observed that "the tax sale immediately and drastically dimin-
ished the value of [the estate's] judgment by granting the [Nolf's] title
free of all liens,"' 'o and that the estate could not participate in the dis-
tribution of the proceeds from the sale because under Pennsylvania law
only "taxing bodies" shared in that distribution.''I
In light of these findings, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that the notice provisions of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale Law
were subject to the mandate of the due process clause.' 12 Under First
Pennsylvania Bank, this meant that a creditor identified in a recorded
judgment was entitled to not only constructive notice by publication, but
also mailed notice to the creditor's last known address or personal ser-
vice.' :3 Because the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale Law did not
provide for such notice, the court concluded that the law violated the
due process rights ofjudgment creditors under the standards of Mennon-
ite Board and First Pennsylvania Bank.' 14
Failing timely objection to a tax sale by a lienholder, Pennsylvania law oper-
ated to divest all liens against the property except mortgages that were recorded
prior to the tax liens. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.609 (Purdon 1968). For the
text of § 5860.609, see supra note 75.
108. 505 Pa. 332-33 & n.2, 479 A.2d at 942-43 & n.2 (citing PA. STAT. ANN.
Lit. 72, § 5860.602, (Purdon 1968)). For the text of § 5860.602, see supra note
77.
109. 505 Pa. at 338, 479 A.2d at 945 (citation omitted). The applicable
notice statute, § 5860.602, did not require either personal or mailed notice of a
pending tax sale to judgment creditors. Id. at 332 & n.2, 479 A.2d at 942 & n.2.
For the text of § 5860.602, see spra note 77.
110. 505 Pa. at 338, 479 A.2d at 945 (citation omitted). Because the credi-
tor did not receive actual notice of the tax sale, the creditor's security for its
legal debt was extinguished without giving the creditor an opportunity to be
heard. Id. at 338, 479 A.2d at 945.
111. Id. at 339, 479 A.2d at 945-46.
112. Id., 479 A.2d at 946.
113. Id. (citing First Pennsylvania Bank, 504 Pa. at 185, 470 A.2d at 941)
(quoting ,1eMnnite Board, 462 U.S. at 798).
114. 505 Pa. at 339, 479 A.2d at 946. The court affirmed the trial court's
order setting aside the sale. Id. The court found meritless the Nolfs' argument
that the trial court erred in refusing to stay the estate's sheriffs sale of the sub-
ject property, refusing to impound the sheriffs deed after the sale, refusing to
permit the Nolfs' to participate in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale,
and refusing to preserve the status quo of the parties during the appeal. Id. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that granting the stay of execution was
within the discretion of the trial court and that when the Nolfs chose not to post
bond within the terms of the trial court's order, they forfeited any rights to the
stay or to complain that the sale was held. Id. at 339-40, 479 A.2d at 946. The
1214 [Vol. 30: p. 1191
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Zappala argued that secured and
unsecured creditors should be entitled to different degrees of notice. 115
According to Justice Zappala, the extension of the Mennonite Board prin-
ciples to judgment creditors, who are unsecured creditors, was "unwar-
ranted" and was an example of the misconstruction of the Mennonite
Board holding that Justice O'Connor warned of in her dissent in that
case.' 16 Justice Zappala observed that the Pennsylvania courts "have
always treated secured creditors, such as mortgagees, and [unsecured
creditors such as] judgment creditors differently," and that judgment
creditors should not be afforded the actual notice protection given to
secured creditors because, unlike the secured creditor, the unsecured
creditor has "neither sought nor bargained for" this protection in his
transaction with the debtor.' 17 Moreover, Justice Zappala stressed that
the judgment creditor's judgment or underlying debt is not extin-
guished by the tax sale as the majority believed, but rather the judgment
creditor's lien is nullified by the sale.' 18 Accordingly, Justice Zappala
argued, there should be no requirement that unsecured judgment credi-
tors be given actual notice.' 19
supreme court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing
to stay the sheriffs sale and that the Nolfs were not entitled to have the sheriff's
deed impounded because they did not proceed according to rule 3132 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 340, 479 A.2d at 946. Rule 3132
provides that
[u]pon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the per-
sonal property or of the sheriffs deed to real property, the court may,
upon proper cause shown, set aside the sale and order a resale or enter
any other order which may be just and proper under the circumstances.
PA. R. Civ. P. 3132.
Addressing the Nolfs' right to participate in the distribution of the proceeds
of the sheriff's sale, the court stated that their right was subordinate to the pay-
ment of the costs of the sale and the tax liens on the property; because the costs
exceeded the purchase bid, there was nothing to distribute to the Nolfs. 505 Pa.
at 340, 479 A.2d at 946. The court held the Nolfs' request was properly dis-
missed. Id.
115. 505 Pa. at 340, 479 A.2d at 947 (Zappala,J., dissenting). Justice Mc-
Dermott joined injustice Zappala's dissent. Id.
116. Id. at 342, 479 A.2d at 947 (Zappala, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of Justice O'Connor's dissent in Mennonite Board, see supra notes 64-70 and ac-
companying text.
117. 505 Pa. at 344, 479 A.2d at 948-49 (ZappalaJ,, dissenting). Accord-
ing to Justice Zappala, "the debtor creates a 'valuable property interest' in the
secured creditor" but not in the unsecured creditor. Id. at 341, 479 A.2d at 947
(Zappala, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 344, 479 A.2d at 949 (Zappala, J., dissenting). Justice Zappala
noted that after the tax sale the judgment creditor still possesses the right to
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IV. THE IMPACT OF MENNIONITE BOARD, FIRST PE.VVSY'LUAAIA BA.\K, AND
IX RE UPSET SALE UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUFFICIENCY
OF THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA'S
EXECUTION SALE LAW
Mennonite Board, First Pennsylvania Bank, and In Re Upset Sale involved
constitutional challenges to the notice requirements of state tax sale
statutes. Although these cases arose in the context of tax sales, their
implications may be broader than that context. When real property is
subjected to a judicial sale in Pennsylvania, mortgagees and judgment
creditors with interests in the property, like the mortgagees and judg-
ment creditors in tax sale cases, may have their interests cut off by the
sale.121 1 Because substantial property rights may be extinguished, due
process may require that Pennsylvania's notice requirements for judicial
mortgage foreclosure sales conform to those for state tax sales.
Under rule 3129 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, ac-
tual notice must be given only to the defendant in the judgment and to
the owner of the subject property.121 Junior mortgagees, lienholders,
and other claimants of record are entitled only to constructive notice of
a sheriffs sale through published advertisements and posted hand-
bills.' 2 2 These notice provisions may violate the due process clause of
the United States Constitution in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Mennonite Board and the holdings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in First Pennsylvania Bank and In re Upset Sale.' 2 3 A recent case settled
out-of-court while pending in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Benefi-
cial Mutual Savings Bank v. Murray,124 presented the issue of the constitu-
120. The effect of ajudicial foreclosure sale in Pennsylvania is to extinguish
the debtor's interest in the property and to transfer title to the purchaser as fully
as it existed in the debtor at the date of the sale. The judicial sale extinguishes
all interests in the real property acquired subsequent to the foreclosed lien. For
a discussion of Pennsylvania law in this regard, see supra notes 19-22 and accom-
panying text.
121. PA. R. Clv. P. 3129(b). For the text of rule 3129, see supra note 14.
122. PA. R. Civ. P. 3129(b)(1), (4). For the text of these provisions, see
supra note 18.
123. For a discussion of Mennonite Board, see supra notes 42-70 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of First Pemsylvania Bank, see supra notes 71-90
and accompanying text. For a discussion of hi re Upset Sale, see supra notes 91-
119 and accompanying text.
124. Beneficial Mut. Say. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-335, slip op. (Pa. Super.
Mar. 15, 1985). The superior court's judgment order stated:
At oral argument of th[e] case, counsel for Beneficial Mutual Savings
Bank (Beneficial), stated that Beneficial had no objection to reversal of
the trial court's order denying Continental Bank's petition to set aside a
sheriffs sale and distribution of proceeds therefrom to Beneficial. Ac-
cordingly, the Order is reversed and the case is remanded for firther
proceedings.
Id. Beneficial, the appellee, did not object to the reversal because of the ott-of-
court settlement reached with the appellant, Continental. It is most likely that
Beneficial agreed to settle the case because no interest was accruing on its share
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tionality of the notice requirements of rule 3129.121 In addition, the
Civil Procedural Rules Committee of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania recently drafted an amendment to rule 3129 in response to
Mennonite Board, First Pennsylvania Bank, and In re Upset Sale.' 1"_
A. Beneficial Mutual Savings Bank v. Murray
In Murray, the owners of the subject real property had given a first
mortgage to Beneficial Mutual Savings Bank and a second mortgage to
the Continental Bank's predecessor in interest, Lincoln Bank, ' 2 7 both of
which mortgages were properly recorded. 128 Thereafter, both mort-
gages went into default, and both mortgagees filed actions in mortgage
foreclosure. 12,1 Beneficial obtained a judgment in mortgage foreclosure
and, pursuant to rule 3129,130 provided notice of its intent to hold a
sheriff's sale of the subject property. 131 Accordingly, the sheriff sent no-
tice of the sale to the mortgagors and notice was also posted and pub-
lished pursuant to rule 3129.132 No notice of the pending sale was
given to Continental. 133 The subject property was sold by the sheriff in
order to satisfy Beneficial's judgment.' 3 4 Continental was not present
because it had not seen the published and posted notices of the pending
of the foreclosure sale proceeds. The time and the costs of the appellate process
probably became prohibitive.
125. Brief for Appellant at iv, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 1984).
126. For a discussion of the proposed amendment to rule 3129, see infra
notes 167-201 and accompanying text.
127. The appeal was taken by Continental Bank, successor in interest
through merger to Lincoln Bank. Brief for Appellee at 6, Beneficial Mut. Sav.
Bank v. Murray, No. 84-335 (Pa. Super. filed July 7, 1984).
128. Brief for Appellant at v, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 1984).
129. Brief for Appellee at 5-7, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filed July 7, 1984). Continental, the successor in interest to the
second mortgagee, had filed a complaint in mortgage foreclosure prior to the
filing of the complaint by Beneficial. Brief for Appellant at v-vi, Beneficial Mut.
Sav. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-335 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 1984). Continental
received a judgment in its action prior to the filing of the complaint in mortgage
foreclosure by Beneficial, yet Continental did not execute on its judgment. Id. at
v-vi. Continental was apparently requested by Judge Hoffman of the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County to refrain from proceeding with execution
pending a settlement attempt. Id. at vi.
130. For the provisions of rule 3129, see supra note 14.
131. Brief for Appellee at 6, Beneficial Mut. Say. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filed July 7, 1984).
132. Id. at 6.
133. Brief for Appellant at vi, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 1984).
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sale. 135
In its petition urging the court of common pleas to set aside the
sheriff's sale and the distribution of proceeds, Continental challenged
the constitutionality of the notice provisions of rule 3129.1M The court
denied Continental's petition.137 In a memorandum opinion, the court
concluded that Continental's due process rights to notice had been sat-
isfied by the required publication and posting pursuant to rule 3129 be-
cause Continental was not the defendant in the judgment nor did it have
an ownership interest in the subject property. ' 8
In its appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Continental for
the first time supported its constitutional argument with the Mennonite
Board and First Pennsylvania Bank decisions. 3 1 Continental argued that
rule 3129 is unconstitutional under Mullane, Mennonite Board, and First
Pennsylvania Bank because it does not require personal service or mailed
notice to be given to a mortgagee in advance of a mortgage foreclosure
135. Brief for Appellee at 6, Beneficial Mut. Say. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filed July 7, 1984).
136. Brief for Appellant at vii, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filedJan. 31, 1984). Continental alleged that the notice require-
ment is constitutionally insufficient in that it does not provide for actual notice
to holders of a recorded interest. Id. at viii.
137. Beneficial Mut. Say. Bank v. Murray, 71 Del. Co. 311, 312-13 (1984)
(Reed, Jr., J.).
138. Id. at 313. Rule 3129 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
only requires that actual notice of a judicial mortgage foreclosure sale be given
to the defendant in the judgment and to the owner or reputed owner of the
property. PA. R. Civ. P. 3129. For the text of rule 3129, see supra note 14.
Moreover, the court of common pleas found, contrary to Continental's alle-
gation, that the price brought by the sale was not grossly inadequate. Murray, 71
Del. Co. at 313.
Concerning notice to parties in interest, rule 3129(c) requires that the pub-
lic notices of the pending sheriffis sale, provided for in rule 3129(b), shall in-
clude a notice directed to all "parties in interest . . . that a schedule of
distribution will be filed by the sheriff on a date specified by the sheriff." PA. R.
Civ. P. 3129(c). For the text of rule 3129, see supra note 14. Judge Reed held
that Continental was not "a party in interest" because it "did not have the pres-
ent ability to discharge or control any part of th[e] action." Murray, 71 Del. Co.
at 313.
Accordingly, Continental had no valid basis for setting aside the sheriff's
sale and Judge Reed denied Continental's petition. Id. Continental appealed to
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Brief for Appellant, Beneficial Mut. Sav.
Bank v. Murray, No. 84-335 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 1984).
139. Continental did not support its argument in the court of common
pleas with either the Mennonite Board or First Pennsylvania Bank cases. 11ennonite
Board was decided on June 22, 1983. 462 U.S. at 791. First Pennsylvania Bank was
decided on December 30, 1983. 504 Pa. at 179, 470 A.2d at 938. Judge Reed of
the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County filed his order on April 18,
1984, which did not include a reference to Mennonite Board or First Pennsylvania
Bank. Murray, 71 Del. Co. at 311. Apparently, either the Mennonite Board and
First Pennsylvania Bank cases had not yet been decided when Continental filed its
petition in the court of common pleas or Continental had not yet discovered the
usefulness of the two decisions in supporting its position.
[Vol. 30: p. 11911218
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sale. 14 0 Continental asserted that the property interest of a mortgagee
is as real as that of a property owner and that a mortgagee is entitled to
the constitutional protections of due process. 14 1 Furthermore, Conti-
nental argued that there should be no difference between the notice re-
quired for a tax sale and that required for a mortgage foreclosure
sale. 14 2 Continental concluded its argument by claiming that under the
principles of Mullane it "was deprived of its right to participate in the
Sheriff's sale... adn thus bid to protect its interest in judgment in mort-
gage foreclosure." 14 3 Supporting this conclusion, Continental reasoned
that it was denied the protections of due process because the notice pro-
vided to it pursuant to rule 3129144 was not reasonably calculated to
apprise it of the pendency of the sale or to afford it the opportunity to
present its obligations to the sale. 1 45
Beneficial answered Continental's constitutional argument by dis-
tinguishing a tax sale and a foreclosure sale and by distinguishing the
property interests of first and second mortgagees. 146 Beneficial asserted
that although the notice provisions of rule 3129 are essentially
equivalent to those held unconstitutional in Mennonite Board and First
Pennsylvania Bank, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
should impose more stringent requirements upon a state that subjects
an individual's property to sale for unpaid taxes than it does upon a
private party that forecloses on property securing a private loan.' 4 7
140. Brief for Appellant at 1-9, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 1984).
141. Id. at 2. Continental was refuting Judge Reed's statement that Conti-
nental, as " 'simply a lienholder,' . . . was not protected by the Constitutional
requirements of due process." Id. at 2 (quoting Murray, 71 Del. Co. at 312). It is
submitted, however, that Judge Reed did not state that a lienholder is not enti-
tled to the protections of due process, but rather that Continental had received
the process it was due as a lienholder because of the constructive notice pro-
vided to it by publication pursuant to Pennsylvania law. See Alurray, 71 Del. Co.
at 312-13.
142. Brief for Appellant at 2, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 1984). Continental asserted that "[t]o attempt
such distinction would be to create arbitrary classes of protected interests." Id.
143. Id. at 5.
144. For the provisions of rule 3129 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, see supra note 14.
145. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No. 84-
335 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 1984). Continental further reasoned that the no-
tice provided to it pursuant to rule 3129 was not a means of notice that the
sheriff would reasonably adopt if he actually wanted to give Continental notice,
was a means of notice that was substantially less likely to actually inform it of the
sale than other means in light of its name and address being a matter of public
record, and was not in compliance with the mandates of rule 3129 itself because
Continental, as a "party in interest," was not named in the published and posted
notice. Id.
146. Brief for Appellee at 17-20, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No.
84-335 (Pa. Super. filed July 7, 1984).
147. Id. at 17-18. Beneficial asserted that when a "State sells an individual's
1985] COMMENT 1219
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Furthermore, Beneficial contended that Murray was distinguishable from
Mennonite Board and First Pennsylvania Bank 148 because Continental was a
second mortgagee and second mortgagees possess less substantial prop-
erty interests than do first mortgagees. 41' In addition, because Conti-
nental did not receive any funds from the proceeds of the sale,
Beneficial argued that Continental had no legally protected property in-
terest under the fourteenth amendment.' 15 Beneficial concluded its ar-
gument by contending that Continental unreasonably failed to protect a
property interest it was capable of protecting, and that "[d]ue process
does not require that [the Commonwealth of] Pennsylvania save Conti-
nental from its own lack of care."' 5' In sum, Beneficial's position was
property for its own benefit as in lennonite Board and First Pennsylvania Bank,
there should be'greater procedures imposed upon the State in order to ensure
that constitutionally adequate notice of the pending tax sale is provided." Id.
Beneficial cited no authorities in support of this contention. Id. Apparently,
Beneficial's argument is that more state action is involved in a tax sale, and
therefore more process is due to individuals whose property interests may be
affected in a tax sale. However, there is state action of a type regulated by the
fourteenth amendment when an individual forecloses upon real property and
subjects it to a sheriffs sale to satisfy a state judgment and pursuant to state
procedures. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Moreover, once state ac-
tion is found, the due process analysis involves a balancing of the competing
interests of the state and the individual's life, liberty, or property interest that is
sought to be protected. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. For a discussion of this
portion of the Mullane opinion, see supra note 55 and accompanying text. The
due process analysis does not focus on the amount of state action involved.
Rather, the existence of any state action is a prerequisite for invoking the due
process analysis. See, e.g., Alulane, 339 U.S. at 307-14 (state law providing means
to close trusts under court supervision triggered due process balancing of state's
interest and interests of trust beneficiaries).
148. M11ennonite Board and First Pennsylvania Bank protected the interests of
first mortgages. For a discussion of Mennonite Board, see supra notes 42-70 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of First Penns ylvania Bank, see supra notes
71-90 and accompanying text.
149. Brief for Appellee at 18-20, Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Murray, No.
84-335 (Pa. Super. filed July 7, 1984). Beneficial pointed out that the "second
mortgage is second in priority of claim to the foreclosure sale" and is necessarily
less substantial than a first mortgage. Id.
150. Id. at 19. It is not clear whether Beneficial would concede that Conti-
nental had a legally protected property interest if the proceeds of the sale had
been sufficiently large to cover all expenses and prior liens and to afford some
return to Continental. If so, it is submitted that Beneficial's argument would
result in the unusual result that no one could determine whether a second mort-
gagee, like Continental, had a legally protected interest until the amount of the
sale proceeds and claims were known.
151. Id. at 19-20 (citing Mennonite Board, 462 U.S. at 809 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting)). Beneficial asserted that Continental was aware of the mortgagors'
poor financial condition because the mortgagors had defaulted on Continental's
loan prior to the foreclosure sale, and, that Continental "should have been look-
ing out for the lien of the first mortgage upon the property." Id. at 20. In addi-
tion, Continental's attorneys subscribed to the legal journal in which notice of
the foreclosure sale was published, yet they failed to recognize the advertise-
ments. Id. at 21.
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that Continental received the process it was due by virtue of the pub-
lished and posted notice of the foreclosure sale.152
Although the Murray case was settled out-of-court before the consti-
tutionality of rule 3129 was decided, it is submitted that the notice pro-
visions of rule 3129 are constitutionally insufficient under Mullane,
Mennonite Board, First Pennsylvania Bank, and In re Upset Sale. Rule 3129 is
unconstitutional because it does not require that the holder of a re-
corded mortgage be given any more notice than that which the general
public receives through posting and publication.' 5 3 Under Mennonite
Board, notice by mail or some other means of "actual notice is a mini-
mum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely
affect the liberty or property interest of any party . . . if its name and
address are reasonably ascertainable."' 154 In Pennsylvania, a judicial
foreclosure sale is such a proceeding.15 5
In addition, it is clear that the holder of a recorded second mort-
gage possesses a constitutionally protected property interest in the
property to be sold at a judicial sale. The Supreme Court of the United
States stated, in Mennonite Board, that a mortgagee possesses a 'substan-
tial" property interest in the real property that is to be sold at a tax
sale. 1561 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in First Pennsylvania Bank,
also found that a mortgagee possesses a legally protectable property in-
terest in real property to be sold at a tax sale.' 57 Neither the Mennonite
Board Court nor the First Pennsylvania Bank court distinguished between
first and junior mortgagees and neither court considered whether the
former possesses a weightier property interest entitled to more constitu-
tional protection. It is submitted that even if a junior mortgagee pos-
sesses a less substantial property interest than a first mortgagee, the
Court in Mennonite Board extended its constitutional safeguards to the
"property interest of any party.. . [whose] name and address are reason-
ably ascertainable."1 58 The holder of a recorded junior mortgage is a
party whose name and address is reasonably ascertainable from the pub-
lic records, and whose property interest may be adversely affected by the
judicial sale of the property securing its interest. Thus, it is submitted
that the holder of a recorded junior mortgage is entitled to personal
152. Id. at 21.
153. See PA. R. Civ. P. 3129. For the text of rule 3129, see supra note 14.
For an interpretation of the notice requirements of rule 3129, see supra notes 14-
18 and accompanying text.
154. 462 U.S. at 800. For a discussion of this portion of the .epmonile Board
Court's analysis of Mullane, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the effects of a foreclosure sale on the interests of
junior mortgagees under Pennsylvania Law, see supra notes 16, 19-22 & 24 and
accompanying text.
156. 462 U.S. at 798.
157. 504 Pa. at 186, 470 A.2d at 940.
158. 462 U.S. at 800.
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service or mailed notice of a pending Pennsylvania sheriff's sale. IM, Fur-
thermore, In re Upset Sale supports the conclusion that the holder of any
recorded interest in property to be sold at a judicial sale is entitled to
mailed notice of the pending sale. 16 0 The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania held in In re Upset Sale that when a "judgment creditor is identi-
fied in a judgment that is publicly recorded, constructive notice by
publication must be given supplemented by notice mailed to the judg-
ment creditor's last known available address, or by personal service as is
the case for mortgagees."'' 6 The court interpreted Mennonite Board to
mean that "due process requires protection of liens because they are
property interests." 162 The court stated that published notice only "ad-
vises the general public" that a parcel of real estate is to be sold and
"does not inform individuals who have property interests that their in-
terests may be affected by the tax sale."' 16 3 Such individuals, the In re
Upset Sale court pronounced, "are entitled to more than a 'squib' in a...
newspaper." 1
64
It is therefore submitted that the notice requirements of rule 3129
are constitutionally insufficient under Mullane, Mennonite Board, First
Pennsylvania Bank, and In re Upset Sale. However, the lengthy appellate
process and the costs associated with a court challenge make it unlikely
that rule 3129 will be reformed in the judicial system. As was probably
the case in Beneficial Mutual Savings Bank v. Murray, constitutional chal-
lenges are usually settled out-of-court because of the fact that interest
does not run on the senior mortgagee's share of the foreclosure sale
proceeds during the appeal process and the appeal becomes too expen-
sive to pursue. 16 5 Accordingly, the notice requirements of rule 3129
must be amended by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The amended
rule should require that personal service or mailed notice of a pending
judicial sale be given to any person who possesses a recorded interest in
real property to be sold at a judicial sale. The Civil Procedural Rules
Committee of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently drafted such
159. See Mennonite Board, 462 U.S. at 798; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; First
Pennsylvania Bank, 504 Pa. at 186, 470 A.2d at 941 (quoting Mennonite Board, 462
U.S. at 798); In re Upset Sale, 505 Pa. at 338, 339, 479 A.2d at 946 (citing First
Pennsylvania Bank, 504 Pa. at 185, 470 A.2d at 941; quoting lennonite Board, 462
U.S. at 798).
160. For a discussion of In re Upset Sale, see supra notes 91-119 and accom-
panying text.
161. 505 Pa. at 338, 479 A.2d at 946 (citing Mennonite Board, 462 U.S. at
798; First Pennsylvania Bank, 504 Pa. at 185, 470 A.2d at 941).
162. Id. at 336, 479 A.2d at 944 (citing Mennonite Board, 462 U.S. at 798)
(emphasis added).
163. Id. at 338, 479 A.2d at 945.
164. Id. For a further discussion of In re Upset Sale, see supra notes 91-119
and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion of the out-of-court settlement in Murray, see supra
note 124.
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an amendment, its "Recommendation Number 68."166
B. Recommendation Number 68
Recommendation Number 68 was drafted in response to the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Mennonite Board, and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's decisions in First Pennsylvania Bank and In re
Upset Sale. 167 Recommendation Number 68 proposes to revise rule
3129 to provide for actual notice of an execution sale of real property to
persons of record who hold liens or other interests in the property to be
sold. 168
Recommendation Number 68 expands the category of persons cur-
rently entitled to actual notice 169 by requiring the executing judgment
166. CIVIL PROCEDURAL RULES COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, RECOMMENDATION No. 68 (October 1984) (Proposed Amend-
ment to PA. R. Civ. P. 3129) (on file at offices of Villanova Law Review) [hereinaf-
ter cited as RECOMMENDATION No. 68]. The Civil Procedural Rules Committee
sent out Recommendation No. 68 to interested members of the legal community
for their comments concerning the proposed amendment to rule 3129 and also
published the recommendation for comment by the Pennsylvania bench and bar
in early October 1984. Letter from Harold K. Don, Jr., Executive Director of
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Rules Committee, to Michael L. Pillion (Oct. 1,
1984). The deadline for responding with any suggestions or comments to the
recommendation was November 19, 1984. Id.
167. RECOMMENDATION No. 68 explanatory comment. The Civil Procedure
Rules Committee believes that although Mennonite Board, First PennslVvania Bank,
and In re Upset Sale "arose in the context of a tax sale and involved notice to
mortgagees and judgment creditors, the implications of the cases are not limited
to their factual contexts" and that "[tihere is a clear analogy between the mort-
gagee orjudgment creditor of a property subject to a tax sale and other persons
with interests in the real property subject to a judicial sale" because "[i]n both
instances, the interests may be lost by virtue of the sale." Id. The committee
believes that the current notice provisions of rule 3129 are constitutionally in-
sufficient because the rule does not require actual notice of a judicial sale of real
property to be given to persons with recorded liens or interests in the property
to be sold. Id.
The explanatory comments to Recommendation No. 68 were "inserted by
the [Civil Rules] Committee for the convenience of the bench and bar . . . and
not to constitute part of the [proposed amendment to rule 3129] nor will they be
officially adopted or promulgated by the [Pennsylvania Supreme] Court." Id.
168. RECOMMENDATION No. 68 explanatory comment.
169. Currently rule 3129 requires that the executing judgment creditor
prepare an affidavit that states, to the best of the creditor's knowledge, the name
and last known address of the owner of the real property to be sold, and of the
defendant in thejudgment. PA. R. Civ. P. 3129(a). The filing of this affidavit is a
prerequisite to the issuance of the writ of execution. Id. For the text of rule
3129(a), see supra note 14. The parties listed in the affidavit are those who,
under the terms of rule 3129, will be given actual written notice of the judicial
sale of the real property. PA. R. Civ. P. 3129(b). All other persons, including
recorded lienholders, receive notice of the pending judicial sale by the posting
of handbills and the publication of advertisements of the sale. Id. For the text of
rule 3129(b), see supra note 14.
The proposed amendment to rule 3129 continues to require that the exe-
cuting judgment creditor list the name and last known address of the owner or
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creditor to state in an affidavit "the name and last known address of
every judgment creditor whose judgment is a lien on the real property
to be sold and of every mortgagee or other person who has any interest
of record in, or lien of record on such property." 71o Under this rule, the
executing judgment creditor must list the persons whose liens or other
interests are known to it either through personal knowledge or from a
required search of the public record. 171 If the judgment creditor cannot
identify or locate a person holding a lien or other interest in the subject
property after its search of the record, it must state this fact in the affida-
vit.' 72 Recommendation Number 68 does not, however, require the
judgment creditor to search beyond the record to identify the holders of
liens or other interests. 173 Once listed in the affidavit, the notice provi-
sion of Recommendation Number 68 requires that these persons be
given personal service or mailed notice of the judicial sale of real prop-
reputed owner of the real property to be sold and of the defendant in the judg-
ment. RECOMMENDATION No. 68 explanatory comment. For the relevant text of
the proposed amendment to rule 3129, see infra note 170.
170. RECOMMENDATION No. 68. As amended, rule 3129(a) would provide:
(a) No writ of execution to sell real property shall issue upon ajudgment until the plaintiff or some person on his behalf has filed of
record with the prothonotary an affidavit setting forth as of a specified date
not more than ten days before itsfiling to the best of [his] the affiant's knowl-
edge, information and belief
(1) the name and last known address of the owner or reputed
owner and of the defendant in the judgment. If after a good faith
investigation the name of the owner or reputed owner or his address or the
whereabouts of the defendant in the judgment cannot be ascertained, the affi-
davit shall so state, and
(2) the name and last known address of everyjndgment creditor whose jndg-
ment is a lien on the real property to be sold and of every mortgagee or other
person who has any interest of record in or lien of record on such property. In
the absence of knowledge to the contraly, the identity and whereabouts of those
persons having a lien or interest of record shall be obtained by examining the
public records identifying interests of liens on property. If the identitv or
whereabouts of such persons cannot be ascertained by examination of the
records, the affidavit shall so state. A copy of the affidavit shall be deliv-
ered to the sheriff together with the writ of execution. [If after a
good faith investigation the name of the owner or reputed owner
or his address or the whereabouts of the defendant in the judg-
ment cannot be ascertained, the affidavit shall so state.]
Id. (emphasis supplied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Civil Procedural
Rules Committee).
171. RECOMMENDATION No. 68 explanatory comment.
172. See RECOMMENDATION No. 68 explanatory comment. The affidavit that
the executing judgment creditor is required to complete pursuant to Recom-
mendation No. 68 must be prepared by the creditor not more than 10 days
before its filing date in order to ensure that the creditor's record search is rea-
sonably current. RECOMMENDATION No. 68. The affidavit must be filed of record
and delivered to the sheriff along with a writ of execution. Id. For the text of the
proposed amendment to rule 3129(c), see supra note 170.
173. RECOMMENDATION No. 68. For the text of the amendment to rule
3129(a), see supra note 170.
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erty. 174 This notice supplements the currently required posting of
174. RECOMMENDATION No. 68. The proposed amendment to rule 3129(b)
provides:
(b) Notice of the sale of real property shall be given by handbills, by
written notice to [the defendant in the judgment and the owner or re-
puted owner] all persons set forth in the affidavit required by subdivision (a),
and by publication, as hereinafter provided.
(1) The handbills shall be posted by the sheriff in his office
and upon the property at least twenty [(20)] days before the sale,
briefly describing the property to be sold, its location, the improve-
ments if any, the judgment of the court on which the sale is being
held, the name of the owner or reputed owner, and the time and
place of sale. The handbill shall also include the notice of a sched-
ule of distribution required by subdivision (c) of this rule.
(2) The written notice shall be prepared by the plaintiff and
shall contain the same information as the handbills and shall be
served by the sheriff at least twenty [(20)] days before the sale on
[the defendant in the judgment if his whereabouts are known and
on the owner or reputed owner if his name and address are known
and on no other person,] all persons setforth in the affidavit required by
subdivision (a). The plaintiff shall direct the sheriff to niake service either
[(a)](i) in the manner provided for the service of a writ
of summons in a civil action upon a defendant, or
[(b)] by registered mail, return requested, addressed to
each one at his last known address set forth in the affidavit]
(ii) by niailing a copy to each person at the address setforth
in the affidavit by ordina),y mail with the return address of the sheriff
appearing thereon. The shefiff shall obtain a U. S. Postal Service Formn
3817 Certificate of Mailing. Service is coniplete upon miailing and if the
mail is returned the validity of the service shall not be iipaired and the
sale shall proceed at the time/fixed in the notice. The certificate of mail-
ing and the letter, if returned, shall be filed of record.
[as the plaintiff may direct at the time he delivers the written notice
to the sheriff for service or, if the plaintiff fails to direct, as the
sheriff may elect.]
[NOTE: Registered mail includes certified mail. See Defini-
tion Rule 76.]
(3) [If the written notice is served by registered mail, service
is complete when the letter is mailed, and if for any reason the
letter is not delivered or claimed or if delivery is refused or if the
return receipt is not executed or if the sheriff fails to receive any
information from the post office respecting the letter before the
date fixed for the sale, the validity of the service shall not be im-
paired and the sale shall proceed at the time fixed in the notice. All
information or material received by the sheriff from the post office
respecting the letter, whether before or after the sale, shall be filed
of record.] Rescinded.
(4) Notice containing the information required by subdivi-
sion (b)(l) shall also be given by publication by the sheriff once a
week for three [(3)] successive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county and in the legal publication, if any, desig-
nated by rule of court for publication of notices, the first publica-
tion to be made not less than twenty-one [(21)] days before the
date of sale.
NOTE: See Note to Rule 3128 as to time, terms and condi-
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handbills and publication of advertisements of the sale. 175
In Mennonite Board, the Supreme Court of the United States inti-
mated in a footnote that the state is required to exert "ordinary efforts"
to ascertain the identity and whereabouts of a mortgagee who is not
even identified in the public record in order to determine the parties
whose interests entitle them to actual notice of a tax sale. 176 In specify-
ing the efforts required of an executing judgment creditor in ascertain-
ing the parties entitled to notice of a Pennsylvania judicial sale,
Recommendation Number 68 requires only a search of the public rec-
ord. 17 7 In its explanatory comment to Recommendation Number 68,
the committee stated that the proposed amendment to rule 3129 does
not require the executing judgment creditor to search beyond the rec-
ord to identify the holders of liens or other interests in the real property
to be executed upon and sold.178 The discrepancy between the Mennon-
ite Board holding and the requirements of Recommendation Number 68
poses a potential constitutional problem. However, because the
Supreme Court did not define "ordinary efforts" in Mennonite Board, it
remains for future cases to clarify whether Recommendation Number 68
satisfies this standard.
A recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case concerning notice of tax
sales of real property, Tracy v. County of Chester Tax Claim Bureau, 179 indi-
cates that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may be inclined to require
an executing judgment creditor to go beyond a mere search of the pub-
lic record to identify persons with interests in the real property to be
executed upon and sold at a sheriffs sale. In Tracy, a partnership trad-
ing under a fictitious name held title to a property under a deed that did
not indicate the names of any of the partnership's principals. 8 1 The tax
claim bureau records showed the partnership's address to be the ad-
tions of sale. See also Rule 3131 as to advertisement where a
parcel of real property extends across county lines.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Civil Procedural
Rules Committee).
For the text of the proposed amendment to rule 3129(a), see supra note 170.
For a discussion of the affidavit requirements of the proposed amendment to
rule 3129(a), see supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
175. RECOMMENDATION No. 68 explanatory comment.
176. 462 U.S. at 798-99 n.4. For the language of the Court's opinion in this
regard, see supra text accompanying note 61. The Mennonite Board Court stated
that it did not mean to suggest that a governmental body make "extraorditiary
efforts" to discover the identity and whereabouts of a mortgagee not identified in
the public record. 462 U.S. at 799 n.4 (emphasis added). This statement sug-
gests that some effort is required. For a discussion ofJustice O'Connor's dissent
in this regard, see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
177. RECOMMENDATION No. 68. For the relevant text of the proposed
amendment to rule 3129(a), see supra note 170.
178. RECOMMENDATION No. 68 explanatory comment.
179. - Pa.-, 489 A.2d 1334 (1985).
180. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 1335.
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dress of a partner who had withdrawn from the partnership subsequent
to the purchase of the property.' 81 The bureau sent notice of an im-
pending tax sale because of tax delinquency by certified mail to the part-
ner's address with delivery restricted to the partnership. 182 The partner
had moved, and the notice was returned to the bureau undelivered. 183
The property was sold at a tax sale and the remaining partners subse-
quently brought an action to set aside the sale. 184
The notice provisions of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale Law
applicable at the time of the sale in Tracy were the same provisions appli-
cable in In re Upset Sale and First Pennsylvania Bank, and required that the
owners of the subject property receive prior notice of a tax sale by certi-
fied mail. ' 8 5 The tax claim bureau argued that it had complied with the
notice requirements and that it had no information on record concern-
ing a change of address for the partnership. 18 6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set aside the tax sale relying upon
the Mullane and Mennonite Board concepts of due process. 18 7 The court
did not hold the notice provisions of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax
Sale Law to be unconstitutional but held that where a taxing authority
plans to subject property to a tax sale "it must notify the record owner
of property by personal service or certified mail, and where the mailed notice
has not been delivered because of an inaccurate address, the authority must make
a reasonable effort to ascertain the identity and whereabouts of the
owner(s)."' 18 8 The court held that a reasonable effort by the tax claim
bureau would have been to check the records of the Secretary of the




184. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 1336. The common pleas court set aside the sale
on the grounds that the notice provisions of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax
Sale Law were not complied with because notice was not sent to the owner's last
known address. Id. The court held that the borough tax collector was on notice
that the partnership had changed addresses because the partnership's new ad-
dress had appeared on checks submitted by the partnership to pay for some of
the taxes it had owed. Id. The common pleas court held that the tax collector's
knowledge was imputed to the tax claim bureau and that the notice of the sale
was defective because it was not sent to the partnership's last known address, as
is required under the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale Law. Id.
The commonwealth court reversed on appeal on the grounds that the print-
ing of a new address on a check submitted to the tax collector does not alone put
the collector on notice of an address change. Id. (citing 76 Pa. Commw. 334,
463 A.2d 125 (1983)).
185. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 1336 n.1 (setting forth PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 5860.602 (Purdon 1968)). For the text of this notice provision, see supra note
77.
186. - Pa. at -, 489 A.2d at 1337.
187. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 1338-39.
188. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied by TraY court).
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of the partners. I"'
In announcing its holding in Tracy, the court relied on the footnote
from Mennonite Board suggesting that a governmental body may be re-
quired to make reasonable, but not extraordinary, efforts to discover the
name and whereabouts of a mortgagee not identified in the public
records. 'I ' Thus, it is submitted that the Tracy opinion indicates that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may be willing to extend the Mennonite
Board Court's "extra-record" search suggestion to the context of a mort-
gage foreclosure sale.
Until the discrepancy between the language of Mennonite Board and
the requirements of Recommendation Number 68 is resolved, a second
argument may save Recommendation Number 68. It is submitted that
the Supreme Court's "extra-record" search suggestion in Mennonite
Board was not necessary to its holding and, as such, is mere dicta. More-
over, it is unlikely that the Court would, if faced with the issue, require
an extra-record search to determine the names and addresses of parties
entitled to receive notice under its Mennonite Board approach. As Justice
O'Connor stated in her dissenting opinion in Mennonite Board, "[i]n all of
the cases relied on by the Court in its analysis, the state either actually
knew the identity or incapacity of the party seeking notice, or that iden-
tity was 'very easily ascertainable.' "191
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the validity and scope
of the extra-record search requirement, it is clear that the Mennonite
Board Court at a minimum implied that some sort of search beyond the
record is required of the state in ascertaining who is entitled to actual
notice of a pending tax sale.'192 If the principles of Mennonite Board are
applicable in the context of a Pennsylvania judicial sale of real property,
the extra-record search suggestion of the Mennonite Board Court may re-
quire an executing judgment creditor to make some effort to identify the
names or whereabouts of holders of unrecorded property interests in
189. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 1339.
190. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 1338 (citing 11mennonile Board, 462 U.S. at 798-99
n.4).
191. 462 U.S. at 805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Schroeder v. City
of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 210-14 (1962) (city constitutionally obliged to give
actual notice to property owner whose name and address were ascertainable
from both deed records and tax rolls)) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 173, 175 (1974) (in class action, all class members whose names and
addresses "may be ascertained through reasonable effort" must be sent individ-
ual notice); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (due process
requires city to give actual notice to resident landowner of record prior to con-
demnation proceedings); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146-47
(1956) (ordinary mailed notice to foreclose lien for delinquent taxes sent by
town to person known to be incompetent and without protection is not due pro-
cess); hlullane, 339 U.S. at 318-20 (due process requires trustee to give actual
notice by mail to beneficiaries whose names and addresses are known before
affecting their property interests)).
192. 462 U.S. at 798-99 n.4.
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the subject property prior to a judicial sale. Such an effort might entail a
physical inspection of the property to determine whether the occupant is
someone other than the owner, the reputed owner, or the defendant in
the judgment.' 1 3 Or, that effort might consist of asking the judgment
debtor the identity of the persons to whom the debtor is currently pay-
ing mortgage payments, and the identity of any persons with liens
against the debtor. Such steps could be required in order to make sure
that there are no persons with interests in the real property other than
those identified in the public record. If an executing judgment creditor
was to discover any persons with unrecorded interests in the subject
property through these means, the creditor would be required to pro-
vide them with actual notice because the language of Recommendation
Number 68 specifies that "[i]n the absence of knowledge to the con-
trary" the identity of persons entitled to receive actual notice is obtained
from the public records.19 4
It is submitted that, if enacted, Recommendation Number 68 would
bring rule 3129 in line with Mennonite Board's constitutional mandate
that actual notice be given to any party whose name and address is rea-
sonably ascertainable prior to a proceeding that will adversely affect a
property interest of such party.' 9 5 Recommendation Number 68 would
193. See RECOMMENDATION No. 68 (entitling owner, reputed owner, or de-
fendant in judgment to actual notice of judicial sale). Under Pennsylvania law,
generally "whatever puts a party on inquiry amounts in judgment of law to no-
tice provided the inquiry becomes a duty.., and would lead to knowledge of the
requisite fact by the exercise of ordinary diligence." Pennsylvania Range Boiler
Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 344 Pa. 34, 38, 23 A.2d 723, 725 (1942) (quoting
Tabor Street (No. 1), 26 Pa. Super. 167, 173 (1904)). Possession of land is no-
tice to all of the possessor's claims and rights in the land. Allardice v. McCain,
375 Pa. 528, 537, 101 A.2d 385, 389-90 (1953). Generally, possession of land
consistent with record title is not notice of any different title or interest in the
land but possession that is inconsistent with title is notice to all of the posses-
sor's claims and rights in the land. Schell v. Kneedler, 359 Pa. 424, 426-27, 59
A.2d 91, 92 (1948).
194. RECOMMENDATION No. 68. For the text of the applicable provision of
Recommendation No. 68, amending rule 3129(a), see supra note 170.
195. 462 U.S. at 798.
The proposed amendment to rule 3129 provides that the actual notice of
the pending judicial sale may be sent by ordinary mail. RECOMMENDATION No.
68. For the text of the proposed amendment to rule 3129(b), see supra note 174.
Rule 3129(b) currently requires that the actual notice be sent by "registered
mail" to the persons listed in the affidavit required by rule 3129(a). PA. R. Civ.
P. 3129(b)(2)(b). For the text of current rule 3129(6)(2)(b), see supra note 14.
"Registered mail" includes certified mail. PA. R. Civ. P. 76.
The proposed amendment to rule 3129 requires the sheriff to obtain and
file of record a certificate of mailing of the notices of the pending sale and, if the
mail is returned, requires the sheriff to file the returned mail in the records.
RECOMMENDATION No. 68.
Rule 3129 as amended would continue unchanged the provision of rule
3129(b)(3) that service is complete upon the mailing of the written notice and
that the validity of service is not impaired by return of the mail. RECOMMENDA-
TION No. 68. Note that rule 3129 as amended would delete the current subdivi-
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therefore comply with the constitutional requirements of the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.19 6
Recommendation Number 68 would place upon executing judg-
ment creditors the additional burdens of performing a title search and
giving actual notice of the sheriff's sale to all persons with recorded in-
terests in the subject property. 197 The burden of providing actual no-
tice could be substantial in certain situations. For example, suppose that
in a mortgage foreclosure action the defaulted mortgagor is named John
Smith and the title report prepared by the title company reveals a hun-
dred or more recorded judgments against "John Smith." Most of the
judgments, if not all of them, are in reality against other persons named
John Smith, yet the title report reveals the judgments anyway. Must the
foreclosing mortgagee give actual notice of the pending judicial sale to
every holder of a judgment that appears in the title report? The answer,
according to Recommendation Number 68, is that the foreclosing mort-
gagee must only give actual notice to the judgment creditors that actu-
ally possess a judgment that is a lien on the real property to be sold.
sion (b)(3) of rule 3129 and would incorporate the provisions of that subdivision
into subdivision (b)(2). Id.
The remaining provisions of the current rule 3129 would not be revised by
Recommendation No. 68 with the exception that subdivision (d) of the current
rule would be amended to make specific reference to four of the different names
by which a stay of a sheriff sale is known across Pennsylvania. RECOMMENDATION
No. 68 explanatory comment. The proposed amendment to rule 3129(d)
provides:
(d) If the sale is stayed, [or] continued, postponed or adjourned gen-
erally, new notice shall be given as provided by subdivisions (b) and (c).
If the sale is stayed, continued, postponed or adjourned at the direction
of the plaintiff to a date certain within forty-five [(45)] days, and public
announcement [of the adjournment and] thereof including the new date is
made to the bidders assembled at the time and place originally fixed for
the sale, no new notice shall be required, but there may be only one
such stay, continuance, postponement or adjournment to a date certain
without new notice.,
RECOMMENDATION No. 68 (emphasis supplied by Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Civil Procedural Rules Committee).
The proposed amendment to rule 3129 retains the construction of current
rule 3129(c) and continues to provide that rule 3129(c) was "[r]escinded and
effective Nov. 6, 1975." Id. The proposed amendment to rule 3129(c) provides:
(c) The notice of sale provided in subdivision (b) shall include a
notice directed to all parties in interest and claimants that a schedule of
distribution will be filed by the sheriff on a date specified by the sheriff
not later than thirty [(30)] days after sale and that distribution will be
made in accordance with the schedule unless exceptions are filed
thereto within ten [(10)] days thereafter. No further notice of the filing
of the schedule of distribution need be given.
Id.
196. For a discussion of the reasoning supporting this submission, see supra
notes 169-75 and accompanying text. For the relevant provisions of the four-
teenth amendment, see supra note 4.
197. RECOMMENDATION No. 68. For the relevant text of the proposed
amendment to rule 3129(a), see supra note 170.
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The mortgagee, however, must discover which creditors have recorded
judgments against the "real" John Smith and may well have to inspect
the docket entries or the filed documents themselves. Even this inspec-
tion might not answer whether a judgment was entered against the title
holder. If Recommendation Number 68 places too much of a burden
upon mortgagees foreclosing on persons with common names, some
mortgagees may be discouraged from making small or risky loans to
persons with common names.
The obligations of large institutional lenders under Recommenda-
tion Number 68 could be exacerbated. Suppose an institutional lender
wants to foreclose on twenty properties in one month. Suppose further
that title searches reveal ten persons with recorded interests in each of
the properties. The lender, in addition to its other legal duties, must
mail two hundred notices to two hundred separate persons at two hun-
dred different addresses. The two hundred notices are an onerous bur-
den upon the lender. They also increase the risk of mistakes in the
contents of the notices themselves. Will one of the sales be set aside
because the institutional lender sent notice to the holder of a recorded
judgment at an outdated address and the sale was held before the judg-
ment holder received the re-routed notice? Can the institutional lender
rely upon the correctness of the names and addresses contained in the
record of persons with recorded interests in the properties, or does the
lender have an affirmative duty to look beyond the record? The issues
raised by the notice required by Recommendation Number 68 could
lead to problems of whether clear title to property may be given at a
judicial sale. The ability to convey clear title, of course, is essential to
the success of any judicial sale.
In addition, a corporate judgment lien holder could cause complica-
tions to a lender in providing the actual notice required by Recommen-
dation Number 68. Suppose that a title search reveals that a corporation
holds a recorded judgment that is a lien against property upon which a
lender is foreclosing. Suppose further that the corporation has since
been merged into another corporation. The lender now has more work
to do in determining who to notify and where to send the notice re-
quired by Recommendation Number 68. Finally, if Recommendation
Number 68 is enacted, the attorney or title company attempting to in-
sure title after a judicial sale might need to investigate what notices were
given and in what manner they were given. If the notice requirements of
Recommendation Number 68 erode the finality of a judicial sale, pro-
spective bidders would be discouraged and bidding might be chilled.
These burdens on the executing judgment creditor would, of
course, impose greater expenses upon the creditor, but the extra ex-
penses would be justified by the increased protection afforded to hold-
ers of recorded interests in the property to be sold. Recorded interest
holders would no longer be forced to rely on advertisements of a pend-
19851 COMMENT 1231
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ing sheriffs sale in a newspaper or on posted notices of the sale."I s In-
stead, they would receive actual notice of the sale, and would thereby
have an opportunity to develop public interest in the sale, and to be
present at the sale in order to protect their interests, or assert any de-
fects of the sale. A holder of a recorded property interest would no
longer be faced with the threat that its interest might be extinguished if
it failed to learn from posted and published notice that the property is to
be sold.' ,11'
Moreover, the executing judgment creditor would probably be able
to pass on the additional expenses that would be imposed by Recom-
mendation Number 68 by claiming the costs of obtaining a title search
and providing additional mailed notices as costs of the sheriff's sale it-
self. If so, junior lienholders frequently would bear the burden of these
expenses because the judgment creditor would be reimbursed for these
expenses before the proceeds from the sale were distributed to junior
lienholders.2 00 Of course, these expense-shifting methods will not help
the foreclosing creditor when the borrower has no equity in the mort-
gaged property, and the sale price is less than the creditor's lien.
The executing judgment creditor also would be able to shift the ex-
tra expenses to the defaulting debtor by drafting an appropriate remedy
clause in the promissory note and mortgage given by the defaulting
debtor to the creditor. Finally, the Uniform Pennsylvania Mortgage
could be amended to provide that the expenses of a title search and the
mailing of actual notices required by Recommendation Number 68 are
recoverable expenses of the executing judgment creditor in pursuing its
remedies as a mortgagee in the event of a default by the mortgagor
under the terms of the mortgage.2 0°
What should lenders and their counsel do prior to the passage of
Recommendation Number 68 or a similar law, in light of Mennonite
198. See PA. R. Civ. P. 3129. For the text of current rule 3129, see supra
note 14.
199. For a discussion of this aspect of Pennsylvania law, see supra notes 19-
28 and accompanying text.
200. For a discussion of the distribution of the proceeds from a judicial sale
of real property, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
201. The Uniform Pennsylvania Mortgage currently provides in pertinent
part as follows:
If the default [by the borrower of the terms of the covenants or agree-
ments of the Security Instrument] is not cured as specified [in the Se-
curity Instrument] [the] Lender at its option may require immediate
payment in full of all sums secured by th[e] Security Instrument without
further demand and may foreclose th[e] Security Instrument by judicial
proceeding. [Thel Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses in-
curred in pursuing the remedies provided in this paragraph [ 1, includ-
ing but not limited to, attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence to the
extent permitted by applicable law.
FORM 3039, FNMA/FHLMC UNIFORM INSTRUMENT-PENNSYLVANIA-SINGLE
FAMILY 1 19 (Dec. 1983).
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COMMENT
Board, First Pennsylvania Bank, and In re Upset Sale? Prudent lenders and
their counsel will provide written notice of pending judicial sales of real
property to all persons with recorded liens or property interests in the
subject property. To reduce the burden of providing such notice, lend-
ers might consider drafting their mortgages and related loan documents
to prohibit judgments against the borrower, and secondary financing on
the mortgaged property. If lenders prohibit judgments and secondary
financing, they can eliminate at least some of the notices that they must
provide in the event that they foreclose upon the mortgaged property.
VI. CONCLUSION
The constitutional principles of due process set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Mennonite Board and the subsequent application
of those standards by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in First Penn-
sylvania Bank and In re Upset Sale indicate that the notice provisions of
rule 3129 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, governing no-
tice of judicial sales of real property, are constitutionally insufficient.
Rule 3129 is inadequate because it does not require an executing judg-
ment creditor to provide personal service or mailed notice of a pending
judicial sale of real property to persons with recorded liens or property
interests in the subject property. Recommendation Number 68, the
proposed amendment to rule 3129, comports with Mennonite Board and
the requirements of the due process clause by providing for actual no-
tice of a pending judicial sale of real property to all persons with re-
corded interests in the property. It is urged that Recommendation
Number 68 be enacted into law as soon as possible to bring Penn-
sylvania's notice provisions for execution sales of real property into line
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